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Abstract 
 
Current systems security practices lack an effective approach to prioritize and 
tailor systems security efforts to develop and field secure systems in challenging 
operational environments, which results in business and mission stakeholders becoming 
more susceptible to an array of disruptive events. This work informs Systems Engineers 
on recent developments in the field of system security engineering and provides a 
framework for more fully understanding the application of Systems Security Engineering 
(SSE) processes, activities, and tasks as described in the recently released National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-160. This SSE 
framework uniquely offers a repeatable and tailorable methodology that allows system 
developers to focus on high Return-on-Investment (RoI) SSE processes, activities, and 
tasks to more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs and deliver trustworthy secure 
systems. 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING, PRIORITIZING, AND APPLYING  
SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING PROCESSES, ACTIVITIES, AND TASKS 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Over the past 50 years, Congress and the DoD have continually explored ways to 
improve system acquisition outcomes, including improvements to sound management 
practices, such as realistic cost estimating, prototyping, Systems Engineering (SE), and 
systems security [3]. Typically, SE and Systems Security Engineering (SSE) are defined 
and shaped by the context, environment, and situation in which they are embedded where 
the classical SE/SSE approach is tailored to and works best in situations in which all 
relevant factors are largely under the control of or can at least be well understood and 
accommodated by the engineering organization and/or the program manager [4]. 
Generally speaking, this situation occurs when system and security requirements are 
relatively well established (between the engineers and the stakeholders), technologies are 
relatively mature, the system is being developed for a single or relatively homogeneous 
user community, and at best a single individual has management and funding authority 
over the program [4].  
However, as the dynamicity of these systems present complexities that scale 
beyond our ability to comprehend, manage, and control, we often find that systems 
security is not adequately addressed in enterprises or supporting systems, resulting in 
business and mission stakeholders becoming susceptible to a considerable array of 
disruptive events [5], [4].  Consequently, special attention is needed to develop more 
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defensible and survivable systems for uncertain, unpredictable, and challenging 
operational environments, to include attacks by intelligent and persistent adversaries. 
Additionally, recent years have seen serious erosion in the ability of U.S. forces to 
quickly field new weapons systems in response to changing threats, as well as a large 
increase in the cost of these weapons systems [7]. For example, the military’s acquisition 
cycle for major weapons systems currently take two to three times longer than 30 years 
ago [7]. While many causes for this trend have been suggested, one common view is that 
better SE and development planning could help shorten the time required for 
development [7]. Another key cause of poor acquisition outcomes is the mismatch 
between the validated capability requirements for a new weapon system and the 
appropriate SE knowledge, funding, and time that is planned to develop that new system 
[3]. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) three key decision making processes for 
acquiring weapon systems (requirements determination, resource allocation, and the 
acquisition management system) are fragmented, making it difficult for the department to 
achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are achievable and affordable and often 
begin with validated requirements that have not been informed by solid SE practices [3]. 
As modern systems continue to increase in size and complexity, security is not 
adequately addressed, resulting in key stakeholders becoming susceptible to attacks from 
intelligent adversaries and a considerable array of disruptive events [1]. Systems, 
networks, and sensitive information can be compromised by malicious and inadvertent 
activities despite best efforts to prevent such events from occurring [2]. These 
vulnerabilities often result in business and mission losses when assets (i.e., people, 
processes, and technology) are insufficiently protected; thus, allowing for system faults, 
3 
degradation, misuse, abuse, and security violations. Such losses can result in mission 
failure and financial ruin, as well as, reduced trust from key stakeholders. 
1.2. Specific Issue 
In order to address this critical systems security gap and meet steadily increasing 
security needs from the commercial sector, international partners, and the defense 
industry in a sustainable manner, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), the National Security Agency (NSA), and several other global industry leaders 
began a collaborative effort to deliver a comprehensive systems-oriented approach to 
SSE [8]. The ultimate objective of NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering is to 
address security issues from a stakeholder requirements and protection needs perspective 
and to use established engineering processes to ensure that such requirements and needs 
are addressed early in and throughout the life cycle of the system [8]. More specifically, 
NIST Special Publication 800-160 is aligned with the SE life cycle processes of 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and provides “considerations for a multidisciplinary approach in 
the engineering of trustworthy secure systems” [8]. 
To maximize the utility of these SSE processes, activities and tasks, it is 
important to understand that systems-level thinking is required in the bringing together of 
expertise and perspectives from multiple disciplines, security specialties, and other 
specialty engineering areas. Moreover, when considering an adversary who is agile, 
intelligent, determined, and highly competent, a systematic way to identify, assess, and 
plan for negative impacts, losses, and associated consequences is critical for the Systems 
Engineer. 
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1.3. Research Objectives 
As current security practices lack effective methodologies to prioritize and 
address system security issues in complex systems, this research effort aims to identify 
gaps in current security approaches and apply the NIST SP 800-160 in a rationalized and 
streamlined process [9]. The research questions to be answered are three-fold:  
1. How can SSE be understood and described with respect to established 
Systems Engineering processes? 
2. How can SSE efforts be decomposed into universally applicable systems 
security domains? 
3. How can SSE processes, activities, and tasks be prioritized and applied to 
diverse classes of systems? 
1.4. The Way Ahead 
Given the progressive nature of the research questions, this thesis will follow a 
scholarly, or k-paper, format. In Chapters 2 and 3, the publications “A Foundation for 
Developing Sustainably Secure Systems” and “Putting the ‘Systems’ in Security 
Engineering: An Examination of NIST Special Publication 800-160” provide Systems 
Engineers and security professionals an update on recent developments in the field of 
SSE to promote a systematic view of security which ensures networked systems operate 
properly despite uncertain environments, malicious and non-malicious disruptions, and 
intelligent adversaries. In addition, these articles offer a brief overview of the NIST SP 
800-160, emphasizing a systematic, yet tailorable approach for system security in order to 
familiarize Systems Engineers with the NIST SP 800-160 and provide a foundation for 
developing sustainably secure systems [9]. In particular, this section explores how the 
NIST SP 800-160 can help the Systems Engineer understand what they are getting from 
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SSE, and emphasizes that Systems Engineers may perform some of the multidisciplinary 
SSE tasks in collaboration with other engineering team members [9]. In doing so, 
Chapters 2 and 3 describe current SSE practices with respect to established SE processes 
as presented in the NIST SP 800-160. 
Chapter 4, “System-Agnostic Security Domains for Understanding and 
Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering Efforts,” puts further focus on the SSE 
approach. More specifically, this article provides a comprehensive discussion of SSE 
concepts, methodologies, and frameworks, in addition to  introducing several competing 
systems security concepts and outlining their respective security domains, noting that the 
preponderance of existing frameworks are intended for Information Technology (IT) and 
cybersecurity applications [4]. This article uniquely analyzes the constituent parts of the 
systems security problem through an SSE perspective by defining seven system agnostic 
security domains in order to better address the systems security problem holistically [4]. 
In doing so, this work represents essential knowledge for understanding how to more 
effectively apply SSE processes for engineering trustworthy and secure systems. By 
utilizing this concept with well-established SSE activities and tasks, this paper identifies 
a means for analyzing the SSE approach and understanding where to focus limited 
resources to maximize the stakeholders’ return on investment [4]. 
In Chapter 5, “A Framework for Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering 
Processes, Activities, and Tasks,” this research looks to incorporate the assessment 
methods presented in Chapter 4 alongside NIST SP 800-160 to investigate its tailorable 
nature and explore how to efficiently apply the NIST SP 800-160 to various classes of 
systems [10]. This work aligns with the goals of the NIST SP 800-160 by examining the 
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tailorable set of SSE activities and tasks to support critical missions and business 
operations [8]. By examining the NIST SP 800-160’s SSE activities and tasks in relation 
to the agnostic security domains of chapter 4, this work describes possible prioritization 
schemes for streamlining demanding security approaches, increasing the manageability of 
SSE efforts, and lowering implementation costs. Finally, conclusions and future work are 
presented in Chapter 6. 
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2. Introduction to SSE Concepts and the NIST SP 800-160 
2.1. Description 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to SSE and is intended to familiarize 
the reader, and in particular Systems Engineers, with the ongoing and recent 
developments in the field of SSE. The article itself explores the history and vision of SSE 
and how the NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering can help Systems Engineers 
understand what they are getting from SSE, and emphasize that Systems Engineers may 
perform some of the multidisciplinary SSE tasks in collaboration with other engineering 
team members.  
This article lays the initial groundwork for future research by introducing the 
systems oriented view of SSE and its evolution over the past few decades. In addition, the 
Authors provide an initial assessment of the draft NIST SP 800-160. 
2.2. Publication Details 
Title: A Foundation for Developing Sustainably Secure Systems 
Publication: INCOSE INSIGHT, Volume 19/Issue 2 
Date: July 2016 
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3. Exploring NIST SP 800-160’s Tailorable Design  
3.1. Description 
This chapter complements the article of chapter 2 and continues to describe the 
systems-oriented components of NIST SP 800-160. Unlike typical standards that define 
elaborate prescriptive security methods, checklists, and directives, the NIST SP 800-160 
uses tailorable Systems Engineering processes, activities, and tasks to address security 
engineering considerations early and sustainably throughout the system’s life cycle. This 
article details how to utilize the NIST SP 800-160, from familiarizing top level 
management with SSE concepts to allowing practitioners to master the specialty domain 
of SSE by building upon the expanded material provided in NIST SP 800-160. 
In this article, the Authors also provide a general overview of the structure of the 
NIST SP 800-160, elaborating on its tailorability for securing system designs, noting that 
regardless of system type, size, or complexity, the NIST SP 800-160 offers a 
customizable “development kit” for engineering trustworthy secure systems. The Authors 
offer an overview of the NIST SP 800-160 and provide a detailed example of the NIST 
SP 800-160’s tailorable design. Lastly, a research agenda into future efforts regarding the 
application of established SSE processes, activities, and tasks for the development of 
complex systems is mentioned. 
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3.2. Publication Details 
Title: Putting the “Systems” in Security Engineering: An Examination of NIST 
Special Publication 800-160 
Publication: IEEE Security & Privacy, Volume 14/Number 4 
Date: July/August 2016 
  
SYSTEMS SECURITY
Editors: Sean W. Smith, sws@cs.dartmouth.edu ❘ William Enck, whenck@ncsu.edu
76 July/August 2016 Copublished by the IEEE Computer and Reliability Societies  1540-7993/16/$33.00 © 2016 IEEE
M odern systems are increas-ingly complex, with exten-
sive infrastructure dependencies 
and interactive system-of-systems 
behaviors. As networked systems, 
they’re inherently susceptible to a 
wide range of malicious and non-
malicious events that can result in 
unexpected disruptions and unpre-
dictable emergent behaviors. In 
addition, the dynamicity of these 
systems present complexities that 
scale beyond our ability to under-
stand, manage, and protect against 
all possible events. Therefore, special 
attention is needed to develop more 
defensible and survivable systems for 
operation in uncertain, unpredict-
able, and challenging environments, 
to include attacks by intelligent and 
persistent adversaries as well as 
instances of abuse and misuse by the 
intended system users.
To address this critical systems 
security gap, the US National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), National Security Agency 
(NSA), and several other indus-
try leaders around the world have 
collaborated in a five-year effort to 
provide a comprehensive systems- 
focused description of systems secu-
rity engineering (SSE). A recent 
milestone in this effort was the May 
2016 announcement of the sec-
ond public draft release of NIST 
Special Publication (SP) 800-160 
Systems Security Engineering: 
Considerations for a Multidisci-
plinary Approach in the Engineer-
ing of Trustworthy Secure Systems.1 
Unlike other NIST 800-series 
special publications and other IT-
focused security standards, NIST 
SP 800-160 employs a systems engi-
neering approach to address stake-
holder protection needs, to satisfy 
security requirements, and to dem-
onstrate systems security trustwor-
thiness.1 More specifically, NIST SP 
800-160 provides a comprehensive 
collection of foundational engineer-
ing considerations in the form of 
SSE activities and tasks based on 
well-established security principles, 
concepts, and practices. 
In this article, we provide a brief 
history of SSE, describe the systems-
oriented components of NIST SP 
800-160, and outline future work 
regarding the application of SSE 
activities and tasks for the develop-
ment of complex systems.
History of SSE
Figure 1 depicts a history of nota-
ble systems security works dating 
back to the 1970s. Initially, the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) 
sponsored several security research 
efforts focused on building and 
assuring computing systems with 
the correct level of protection.2,3 
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These works culminated in the 
“Trusted Computer System Evalu-
ation Criteria,” otherwise known as 
the revered “Orange Book.”4 (Note 
that the “Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria” evolved into 
the “Common Criteria” and con-
tinues to serve as an internationally 
recognized methodology for evalu-
ating IT products.5) Despite their 
focus on computer security, these 
early efforts recognized the founda-
tional systems nature of their work: 
“[P]roviding satisfactory security 
controls in a computer system is in 
itself a system design problem … a 
combination of hardware, software, 
communication, physical, person-
nel, and administrative-procedural 
safeguards.”2 Thus, the specialty 
domain of systems security was 
informally born from the culmina-
tion of these efforts.
In 1989, the DoD formalized this 
systems security concept in Military 
Standard (MIL-STD) 1785, which 
defined both the technical and 
managerial aspects of SSE for the 
first time.6 While MIL-STD 1785 
emphasizes the systematic applica-
tion of scientific rigor, it also rein-
forces that security must be treated 
no differently from any other system 
capability or quality characteristic:6 
Systems Security Engineer-
ing (SSE). An element of sys-
tem engineering that applies 
scientific and engineering prin-
ciples to identify security vulner-
abilities and minimize or contain 
risks associated with these vul-
nerabilities. It uses mathe-
matical, physical, and related 
scientific disciplines as well as 
the principles and methods of 
engineering design and analysis 
to specify, predict, and evaluate 
the vulnerability of the system to 
security threats.
During the IT bubble of the 1990s 
and 2000s, these initial systems- 
oriented security notions lapsed as 
researchers concentrated almost 
exclusively on network security and 
information assurance. During these 
years of rapid computing advance-
ments, recognized security expert 
Ross Anderson was one of only a 
few who continued to build a holistic 
view of systems security in his semi-
nal work Security Engineering.7 
In 2011, the DoD once again 
acknowledged its need for an inte-
grated, systems approach for devel-
oping secure systems.8 Accordingly, 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Systems Engineer-
ing led the DoD’s revitalization 
of SSE through the methodology 
defined as Program Protection.9,10 
Although this effort serves well to 
bring system security concepts and 
principles to protect critical pro-
gram information, technologies, 
and critical components (that is, the 
realization of protections for corpo-
rate intellectual property and criti-
cal capability assets), the specialty 
discipline of SSE as described in 
MIL-STD 1785 was never fully real-
ized.11 This left the security commu-
nity without a systematic approach 
to effectively build in security for 
complex, unprecedented systems.
Why NIST SP 800-160?
To meet steadily increasing systems 
security needs from the commercial 
sector, international partners, and 
the defense industry in a sustain-
able manner, NIST and NSA began 
a collaborative effort to deliver a 
systems-oriented approach to SSE 
in order to “address security issues 
from a stakeholder protection 
needs and requirements perspec-
tive.”1 More concretely, NIST SP 
800-160 ensures systems security 
requirements are “addressed with 
appropriate fidelity and rigor” by 
aligning with the engineering view-
point captured in the 30 systems 
life-cycle processes of ISO/IEC/
IEEE 15288. 1,12
In contrast to typical standards 
that define elaborate prescriptive 
security methods, checklists, or 
the like, NIST SP 800-160 uses 
the tailorable systems engineer-
ing processes to address security 
engineering considerations early 
and sustainably throughout the 
Figure 1. A concise history of systems security engineering (SSE). This timeline captures the major publications that contributed to the 
formalized need for and establishment of US National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-160.
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system’s life cycle. Perhaps the best 
way to understand “why NIST SP 
800-160?” is through its fivefold 
purpose:1
 ■ to provide a basis to formalize a 
discipline for SSE in terms of its 
principles, concepts, and activities;
 ■ to foster a common mindset to 
deliver security for any system, 
regardless of its scope, size, com-
plexity, or stage of the system life 
cycle;
 ■ to provide considerations and 
to demonstrate how SSE princi-
ples, concepts, and activities can 
be effectively applied to systems 
engineering processes;
 ■ to advance the field of SSE by pro-
mulgating it as a discipline that 
can be applied and studied; and
 ■ to serve as a basis for the develop-
ment of educational and training 
programs, including the develop-
ment of individual certifications 
and other professional assess-
ment criteria.
Consequently, NIST SP 800-160 
provides a comprehensive descrip-
tion of SSE, which makes it argu-
ably the most significant work in 
the systems security field to date.13 
Moreover, it’s useful to a wide audi-
ence of security-minded profession-
als from young security specialists 
to seasoned program managers.
How to Use NIST 
SP 800-160
Because of NIST SP 800-160’s five-
fold purpose, its usage and reader-
ship are quite broad. Moreover, 
the publication (not a standard) is 
written primarily as an SSE refer-
ence, organized across 30 system 
life-cycle processes and not meant 
to be read from top to bottom. For 
example, managers required to 
work with systems security engi-
neers might simply read the seven 
pages of chapter 1 to become more 
familiar with SSE. Conversely, 
those trying to master the specialty 
domain of SSE will benefit from 
NIST SP 800-160’s detailed chap-
ters and appendixes that clearly 
explain foundational SSE concepts, 
such as a systems perspective, active 
and passive protection capabilities, 
and security design principles. 
In addition, NIST SP 800-160 
is well suited to support special-
ized certifications and educational 
programs such as the Information 
Systems Security Engineering con-
centration of the Certified Informa-
tion Systems Security Professional 
or the graduate certificate offered 
by the US Naval Postgraduate 
School.14 This is particularly impor-
tant for security-minded organi-
zations concerned with systems 
security training and education. For 
example, the DoD is trying to edu-
cate a large workforce consisting of 
hundreds of thousands of personnel 
across the US Army, Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Air Force.
Furthermore, there are several 
practical reasons for those already 
working in the systems security 
space to read and review NIST SP 
800-160. For example, chief security 
officers will want to become famil-
iar with it to determine how their 
development life cycle will change, 
system and software developers 
might want to revise and refine their 
existing engineering life cycles, and 
security researchers (particularly 
those studying security require-
ments) will want to become familiar 
with new engineering recommen-
dations. In addition, systems secu-
rity researchers will want to closely 
watch for lessons learned and appli-
cation gaps in NIST SP 800-160 
because these could very well lead 
to new areas of research. 
Building a Systems 
Perspective
SSE is concerned with the devel-
opment of a system’s security 
capability and with the protec-
tion of sensitive data, informa-
tion, processes, technologies, and 
intellectual property throughout 
the system’s entire life cycle. That is, 
trustworthy systems must be con-
ceptualized, designed, built, oper-
ated, sustained, and retired while 
accounting for and attempting to 
control asset losses and associ-
ated negative consequences. Thus, 
as Anderson comments, “security 
engineering is about building sys-
tems to remain dependable in the 
face of malice, error, or mischief.”7 
In this regard, SSE has two predom-
inant roles in the larger systems 
engineering effort:1
 ■ engineering the security protec-
tion capability of the system, and
 ■ advising on the security aspects of 
the entire system.
Successful execution of these 
two roles requires an SSE “presence” 
throughout all ISO/IEC/IEEE 
15288 system life-cycle processes. 
In this way, NIST SP 800-160 pro-
vides a systematic methodology for 
applying SSE principles, concepts, 
and practices with an emphasis on 
capturing security requirements and 
associated verification measures, 
engineering security capabilities, 
and conducting verification and val-
idation activities to provide eviden-
tiary data to support assertions that 
security claims have been met.
SSE Activities and Tasks
NIST SP 800-160 provides a sys-
tematic approach to meeting 
stakeholders’ security needs and 
objectives through the application 
of SSE activities and tasks. As Fig-
ure 2 shows, NIST SP 800-160 is 
organized in a three-chapter for-
mat with several detailed appen-
dixes. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce 
the specialty domain of SSE and 
lay the necessary foundation for 
executing the SSE-oriented activi-
ties and tasks. Chapter 3 is orga-
nized into four families of system 
life-cycle processes (technical, 
management, project enabling, and 
78 IEEE Security & Privacy July/August 2016
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agreement) with a total of 111 SSE 
activities and 428 tasks across the 
30 systems engineering life-cycle 
processes described in ISO/IEC/
IEEE 15288.  
Presented as a tailorable engi-
neering approach to satisfy stake-
holder needs, the SSE activities 
extend the activities and tasks of 
the parent system’s engineering life-
cycle processes to directly address 
security-specific considerations and 
outcomes. The SSE activities are 
based on well-established security 
principles, concepts, methods, and 
best practices; these are detailed in 
several of the publication’s accom-
panying appendixes. The detailed 
SSE tasks are designed to provide 
substantiated evidence-based con-
fidence to assert that the system 
and its protective measures behave, 
interact, and produce outcomes 
only as specified and, therefore, 
warrant the trust that stakehold-
ers place in the system. Further-
more, to maximize the utility of 
the prescribed SSE activities and 
tasks, it’s important to realize that 
they’re each complex undertak-
ings involving close coordination 
among various domain experts 
and stakeholders throughout 
each of the systems engineering 
processes. This holistic approach 
serves to build a multidisciplinary 
approach to engineering secure 
trust worthy systems.13
Applying SSE Activities 
and Tasks
As systems increase in size and 
complexity, they become more 
susceptible to a wide range of mali-
cious and nonmalicious disruptive 
events.8 Moreover, critical systems 
(those with unrecoverable loss con-
sequences) are increasingly charac-
terized by reliance on distributed 
technologies that provide a range 
of automated and autonomous 
capabilities. These systems might 
include automotive assembly lines, 
banking and financial systems, 
communication networks, cyber-
physical systems, systems of sys-
tems, military weapon systems, and 
the Internet of Things. Regardless 
of the system type, size, or complex-
ity, NIST SP 800-160 is applicable, 
offering a customizable “develop-
ment kit” for delivering trustworthy 
secure systems.
Thus, as system security engi-
neers constrained by real-world 
costs and timelines, we’re inter-
ested in more fully understanding 
how to effectively apply the 111 
SSE activities and associated 428 
tasks of NIST SP 800-160. In future 
work, we’ll study how to best apply 
the tailorable SSE processes, activi-
ties, and tasks to different classes 
of development (for instance, new 
acquisitions or legacy systems) 
and types of systems (for instance, 
distributed cybersystems, autono-
mous transportation systems, airlin-
ers, satellites, and control systems) 
to make better-informed security-
related tradeoffs.15 Moreover, we’re 
Figure 2. Selective overview of NIST SP 800-160 on SSE. Each process area is further elaborated on in chapter 3 of the publication, providing vast 
tailorable options to secure system design. For example, the figure outlines the associated tasks to only the Quality Assurance Activity listed 
under the Technical Management Processes.
Chapter 3 SSE Processes, Activities, and Tasks: 128 pages
8 technical management processes
(29 activities, 116 tasks)
2 agreement processes
(10 activities, 23 tasks)
• Prepare for security quality assurance
• Perform product or service security evaluations
• Perform process security evaluations
• Manage quality assurance security records and reports
• Treat security incidents and problems
Technical
Management
Processes
Detailed SSE Quality
Assurance Tasks
• Project Planning
• Project Assessment
and Control
• Decision Management
• . . .
• Configuration Management
• Information Management
• Measurement
• Quality Assurance
Appendixes (Guides to Fundamental Knowledge): 100+ pages
• Systems Security Activities and Tasks
• Roles, Responsibilities, and Skills
• Design Principles for Security
• Engineering and Security Fundamentals
• System Resiliency
• Security Requirements and Considerations
• Hardware Security and Assurance
• Software Security and Assurance
• System Security Analyses
• Risk Management Framework
14 technical processes
(54 activities, 232 tasks)
6 organizational project-enabling
processes (18 activities, 57 tasks)
Chapter 2 e Fundamentals: 15 pages
• Ensure appropriate security principles, 
   concepts, methods, and practices are applied 
   to adequate security claims
• Perform security analyses with the
   appropriate fidelity and rigor to substantiate 
Chapter 1 Introduction: 7 pages
• Develop a basis to formalize SSE discipline and 
   mindset
• Consider and demonstrate how SSE can be 
   applied to SE processes
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interested in examining the level of 
effort (that is, the number of system 
security engineers, systems engi-
neers, and other security-minded 
professionals) necessary to suc-
cessfully execute the proposed SSE 
activities and tasks.
SSE is increasingly recognized as an important specialty domain, 
responsible for the trustworthi-
ness of complex systems. Although 
several standards and publications 
exist in the cybersecurity space, 
NIST SP 800-160 uniquely deliv-
ers a systems-oriented approach 
to ensuring stakeholder security 
requirements and protection needs 
are met with appropriate fidelity 
and rigor. More specifically, the 
SSE activities and tasks described 
in NIST SP 800-160 provide a 
comprehensive set of systems secu-
rity considerations for engineering 
more defensible and survivable sys-
tems while facing untold disrup-
tions, losses, hazards, and threats. 
As the most systematic treatment of 
systems security available to date, 
NIST SP 800-160 is sure to impact 
both the theory and practice of SSE 
as it’s adopted and applied across 
various commercial, government, 
and military systems. 
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4. Universally Applicable Systems Security Domains 
4.1. Description 
This work introduces SSE concepts, methodologies, and frameworks, as well as 
discusses several competing systems security concepts and outlining their respective 
security fields. In doing so, this work analyzes the constituent parts of the systems 
security problem through a systems security perspective by defining seven system 
agnostic security domains in order to better address the SSE problem holistically.  
These abstracted domains serve as a common baseline for implementing SSE 
while thoroughly understanding and discussing the system security problem in addition to 
building confidence in inter-organizational activities such as developing security 
standards and effective security practices. The utility of these security domains are 
further amplified as the Authors provide three example prioritization schemes based on 
the importance (or criticality) of each security domain according to particular system 
types or classes. This allows organizations to determine which domains are more 
important and therefore warrant more resources. 
As a result, this work represents essential knowledge for understanding how to 
more effectively apply SSE processes for engineering trustworthy and secure systems. By 
utilizing this concept with well-established SSE activities and tasks, this effort identifies 
a means for analyzing the SSE approach and understanding where to focus limited 
resources to maximize the stakeholders’ security and return on investment. 
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Abstract—As modern systems continue to increase in size and 
complexity, current systems security practices lack an effective 
approach to prioritize and tailor systems security efforts to 
successfully develop and field systems in challenging operational 
environments. This work uniquely proposes seven system-
agnostic security domains which assist in understanding and 
prioritizing Systems Security Engineering (SSE) efforts. To 
familiarize the reader with the state-of-the-art in SSE practices, 
we first provide a comprehensive discussion of foundational SSE 
concepts, methodologies, and frameworks. Next, the seven 
system-agnostic security domains are presented for consideration 
by researchers and practitioners. The domains are intended to be 
representative of a holistic SSE approach which is universally 
applicable to multiple systems classes and not just a single system 
implementation. Lastly, three examples are explored to illustrate 
the utility of the system-agnostic domains for understanding and 
prioritizing SSE efforts in Information Technology (IT) systems, 
Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems, and cyber-
physical systems. 
 
Index Terms—Security Domains, Systems Security 
Engineering, Systems Engineering, Security Engineering 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 As modern systems continue to increase in size and 
complexity, security is not adequately addressed, resulting in 
key stakeholders becoming susceptible to attacks from 
intelligent adversaries and a considerable array of disruptive 
events [40]. These vulnerabilities often result in business and 
mission losses when assets (i.e., people, processes, and 
technology) are insufficiently protected; thus, allowing for 
system faults, degradation, misuse, abuse, and security 
violations. Such losses can even result in mission failure and 
financial ruin, as well as, reduced trust from key stakeholders. 
 In a recent call to arms, Principal Deputy to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering 
Kristen Baldwin stresses the need for integration and 
formalization of Systems Security Engineering (SSE) methods, 
processes, and tools into established systems engineering 
efforts [1]. More specifically, it identifies three key trends 
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which pose serious security challenges to modern programs 
and systems. The first challenge describes how systems 
increasingly rely on commercially available technologies; 
whether open source or proprietary, cost-conscience 
commercial technologies are seldom manufactured with 
security in mind [1]. This means, adversaries across the world 
can purchase, reverse engineer, and identify vulnerabilities in 
critical systems, sub-systems, and components more easily. 
The second challenge to systems security is accountability 
during acquisition. Complex supply chains often obfuscate the 
point of origin and composition of system components. 
Furthermore, with multiple tiers of prime contractors, 
subcontractors, and suppliers, the chain of custody often 
becomes confusing and misreported. The third challenge is the 
increasingly complex, dynamic, and interconnectedness of 
systems (i.e., large Systems-of-Systems with many networked 
interactions). This results in difficulty proving that systems, 
across their execution states and modes, are secure. Moreover, 
extensive dependencies may lead to the concealment of 
lingering vulnerabilities.  
To address the SSE problem holistically, this work 
proposes seven system-agnostic (or system-neutral) security 
domains to examine its constituent parts. While the term 
“domain” may invoke particular implications depending on the 
context of its use, we use it here to refer to design principles 
and concepts at a system-agnostic intended for universal 
applicability across a broad range of systems. This level of 
abstraction is desirable to promote systems thinking and an 
overarching view of systems security ideas within the systems 
engineering specialty domain of SSE [2]. Note that this 
“systems” approach is in contrast to most security approaches 
which promote a rather narrow view of specific security 
concerns within a particular application domain (e.g., mobile 
computing or cloud storage systems). The domains described 
in this work discuss issues pertinent to all system types 
regardless of their application. In doing so, we also hope to 
help practitioners and researchers uncover additional areas of 
study, as the introduction of these abstracted domains 
themselves do not sufficiently solve the overarching issues of 
SSE complexity and non-uniformity across the spectrum of 
possible systems;  rather, they provide opportunities for 
expansion of the concept. We stress that the proposed system-
agnostic domains are not intended to be formal specifications 
but merely provide an example of how security domains can 
be defined and utilized for studying various Systems of 
Interest (SoI). 
System-Agnostic Security Domains for 
Understanding and Prioritizing Systems 
Security Engineering Efforts 
S. Khou, L.O. Mailloux, Member, IEEE, J. M. Pecarina, and M. A. McEvilley 
 The article is organized as follows. In Section II, a 
comprehensive discussion of SSE concepts, methodologies, 
and frameworks is provided for the reader. We also outline 
their respective security domains, noting that the 
preponderance of existing frameworks are intended for 
Information Technology (IT) and cybersecurity applications. 
Section III proposes seven system-agnostic security domains 
for understanding how to more effectively apply SSE efforts. 
This work is not intended to provide a new standard, but rather 
an approach for prioritizing the SSE processes, activities, and 
tasks as described in the recently published National Institute 
of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 
800-160 Systems Security Engineering [14].  
 Section IV provides example methods and suggestions for 
developing prioritization schemes based on the importance (or 
criticality) of each security domain according to the particular 
SoI type or class. Finally, in Section V, we conclude with a 
discussion on the implications of our work and outline future 
research goals. Ultimately, this work seeks to extend the 
baseline knowledge of systems security engineers and those 
responsible for executing SSE roles and responsibilities [43]. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 In this section, we offer the reader foundational background 
knowledge on the development of SSE. In doing so, we note 
that the majority of security literature speaks to security only 
from an IT or cybersecurity perspective. While systems 
security has been studied for many decades, a fully 
encompassing philosophy ensuring that our daily personal and 
professional activities remain secure has yet to surface due to a 
lack of fundamental science underlying current security 
practices [42]. 
A. History of Systems Security Engineering (SSE) 
 Early security research efforts by the United States 
Department of Defense (DoD) focused on the challenge of how 
to build and assure computing systems with the correct level of 
protection [6], [34]. These efforts culminated in the Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly 
referred to as the “Orange Book” in 1983 [4]. Of note, the 
Orange Book set basic requirements for assessing the 
effectiveness of security controls built into computer systems 
and was primarily used to evaluate, classify, and select 
computer systems for processing, storage, and retrieval of 
sensitive or classified information. Despite their focus on 
computer security, early works recognized the foundational 
systems nature of their task [6]. For example, the 1970 Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Computer Security concluded 
that providing satisfactory security controls in a computer 
system is itself a system design problem [6]. Moreover, the 
board specifically identified security as a systems problem: “a 
combination of hardware, software, communications, physical, 
personnel, policy and procedural safeguards” [6].  
 In 1989, the DoD formalized this systems security concept 
in Military Standard 1785 (MIL-STD 1785), which defined the 
technical and managerial aspects of SSE for the first time [7]. 
Subsequently, the National Security Agency (NSA) created a 
draft set of secure design principles in 1993, which emerged 
from a study on rules for system composition [8], [35]. While 
not a finished effort, the study represented collective wisdom 
that needed to stand the test of time, and perhaps more 
importantly, practice. Additionally, in response to 
recommendations by the US National Research Council in 
December of 1990 to promulgate comprehensive, generally 
accepted security principles, the International Information 
Security Foundation (IISF) began drafting the Generally 
Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) [8], [9]. 
Originally drafted in 1992, it was left unfinished until its 
adoption by NIST in 1996 (NIST SP 800-14 Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices for Security Information 
Technology Systems [10]) and later the Information Systems 
Security Association in 2003 (Generally Accepted Information 
Security Principles [9]). 
B. IT Focused Security Efforts 
While initial systems security efforts served to protect 
information systems well, a holistic systems-oriented view of 
security was largely overshadowed by the rapid development 
of network security and information assurance during the IT 
bubble of the 1990s and early 2000s. In the meantime, other 
countries began their own initiatives to develop evaluation 
criteria influenced largely by the concepts presented in the 
United States’ TCSEC. These included the Information 
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), published in 
1991 by the Commission of the European Communities 
(largely based on works from France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) [11], as well as, the 
Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria 
(CTCPEC), published in 1993 by the Communications 
Security Establishment [12]. The TCSEC, ITSEC, and 
CTCPEC efforts eventually culminated in an international 
collaboration in 1999 to produce ISO/IEC 15408: Information 
technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT 
security, otherwise known as the Common Criteria for 
Information Technology Security Evaluation (often 
abbreviated as “Common Criteria” or simply “CC”). The 
Common Criteria provides a shared set of requirements for the 
security functionality of IT products and for assurance 
measures applied to these technologies [13]. 
C. A Resurgence of Systems-Oriented Security 
More recently, a collaborative effort between NIST and 
NSA was formed in 2010 to continue the systems approach to 
security MIL-STD 1785 began some 20 years prior. In 2012, 
the initial public draft of NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security 
Engineering was published (with the full release version 
published November 2016), providing a comprehensive 
description of systems-oriented security engineering 
considerations [2], [14]. Likewise, in 2011 the United States 
DoD publicly acknowledged the need for an integrated 
approach for developing secure systems as they revitalized 
their SSE approach through established methodologies such as 
Program Protection Planning (i.e., SE processes throughout the 
system lifecycle) [1], [15]. Similarly, the on-line Guide to the 
Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (SEBoK) recognizes 
that the primary objective of SSE is to apply SE principles and 
practices during all system development phases in order to 
minimize (or contain) system vulnerabilities to known and 
postulated security threats, ensuring that developed systems are 
adequately protected [16]. 
D. Modern SSE Concepts and Frameworks 
 In this section we introduce foundational SSE concepts and 
review several popular security frameworks. Experience has 
shown that systems often exhibit behaviors that are 
unanticipated in the design process, even when formal design 
process exists [5]. Fundamental analysis of system security, 
and thus risk to successful mission execution, requires 
necessarily anticipating conditions in which the SoI is forced 
outside its normal operating constraints. Furthermore, these 
analyses are complicated by the high degree of connectivity 
between independently managed systems, where formal 
assessments can be prohibited by the affected systems’ 
management [17].  
With regard to the challenge of developing secure systems, 
security expert Ross Anderson observed that security 
engineering is about building systems to remain reliable 
through intentional and unintentional disruption, to include 
malice, error, or mischief [18]. In the same respect, the need for 
cyber resiliency has been increasingly recognized in recent 
years; there is a need for information and communications 
systems and the missions and business functions which depend 
on them to be resilient under attacks focused on cyber 
resources [41]. Thus, SSE has two predominate roles within the 
larger SE effort: 
• Engineering the security functions that provide system 
security protection 
• Engineering the security-driven constraints on the entire 
system 
Note, a possible third role exists in the engineering of 
protection for life cycle assets as exemplified in aspects of 
DoD Program Protection [15]. Successful execution of these 
roles requires a tailored SSE “presence” throughout the 30 SE 
life cycle processes of ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [5]. While meta-
engineering SSE methodologies may exist, such as the Systems 
Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) 
(which has evolved into ISO/IEC 21827), the majority of 
security literature speaks to security only from an IT or 
cybersecurity perspective [44]. For example, two of the most 
predominantly exercised methodologies and frameworks for 
understanding, developing, and fielding secure systems are the 
Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) 
[19] and the ISO/IEC 27002: Information technology — 
Security techniques — Code of practice for information 
security management [20]. The CISSP provides a Common 
Body of Knowledge (CBK) relevant to information security 
professionals and establishes a common framework for 
information security terms and principles which allows 
professionals to discuss, debate, and resolve related matters 
with a common understanding [19]. Conversely, the ISO/IEC 
27002 provides recommendations on IT and cybersecurity 
management for use by those responsible for initiating, 
implementing or maintaining IT and cybersecurity security 
management systems [20]. 
 On the other hand, methodologies like the SSE-CMM 
deliver the necessary roadmap for adopting organization-wide 
security engineering practices, but do not specifically point out 
any tools or techniques that can be used to help reach the goals 
described in the process areas [44], [45]. They are rather used 
as a means for engineering organizations to evaluate their 
existing security engineering practices and define 
improvements to them [44], [45]. 
 Summarized in Table I, six commonly referenced security 
frameworks include the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services 45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
Part 95, Subpart: F [21]; ISO/IEC 27002 [20]; Federal 
Information Processing Standards 200 (FIPS 200) [22]; the 
International Information System Security Certification 
Consortium (ISC)2 CISSP CBK [19]; the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Systems Sector-
Specific Plan, an annex to their National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan [23]; and the DHS Catalog of Control Systems 
Security for protecting critical infrastructure [24]. Collectively, 
these works outline provisions for establishing a minimum 
baseline or system-agnostic security considerations (each from 
their respective area), which are often acknowledged in 
multiple concepts or frameworks (as described in Section III). 
While this is not an exhaustive list of all existing  security 
frameworks, it endeavors to be representative sample of these 
frameworks. In particular, there work offers representation for 
traditional IT and cybersecurity systems, cyber-physical 
systems, transportation systems, industrial control systems, and 
government requirements on similar systems; this subset 
provides a diverse yet comprehensive sampling of possible 
systems.   
TABLE I 
SECURITY FRAMEWORKS 
Security 
Framework Description 
45 CFR Part 
95 (1990) 
Outlines provisions for establishing minimum standard 
requirements for the security of all developmental or 
operational federally funded automatic data processing 
systems 
FIPS 200 
(2006) 
Addresses the specification of minimum security 
requirements for federal information and information 
systems 
Transportation 
Systems 
Sector-
Specific Plan 
(2010) 
Describes collaboratively developed strategies to reduce 
risks to critical transportation infrastructure and build a 
set of programs and initiatives to reduce the sector’s 
most significant risks in an efficient, practical, and cost-
effective manner 
Catalog of 
Control 
Systems 
Security for 
CIKR (2011) 
Presents a compilation of practices that various industry 
bodies have recommended to increase the security of 
control systems from both physical and non-physical 
(cyber) attacks and is specifically designed to provide 
the framework needed to develop sound security 
standards, guidelines, and best practices 
ISO 27002 
(2013) 
Provides recommendations on IT and cybersecurity 
management for use by those responsible for initiating, 
implementing or maintaining IT and cybersecurity 
security management systems 
CISSP (2015) 
Establishes a common framework of information 
security terms and principles which allows for 
professionals to discuss, debate and resolve related 
matters with a common understanding 
III. EXAMINING THE SYSTEMS SECURITY DOMAINS 
This section proposes seven abstracted systems security 
domains to broadly describe a “system-agnostic” approach for 
universally understanding and categorizing systems security 
concerns into distinct domains. In Table II, we map the six 
frameworks and their associated domains from Table I into 
seven recommended system-agnostic domains. The abstracted 
domains are intended to serve as a common baseline for 
implementing SSE while thoroughly understanding and 
discussing the systems security problem in addition to building 
confidence in inter-organizational activities such as developing 
security standards and effective security practices. These 
domains also infer that the complexity and diversity of security 
needs and domains that contribute to system security is indeed 
“defense in depth,” a commonly applied architecture and 
design approach which implements a composition of various 
defenses and countermeasures to provide multiple 
opportunities to stop an attack using different techniques and/or 
tools in the event a security control fails [19]. 
TABLE II 
SECURITY DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS 
System-
Agnostic 
Mapping 
Associated Security Domains  
(from the security frameworks listed in Table I)  
Compliance 
Auditb,d; Accountabilityb,d; Planningb,c,d; 
Certificationb; Accreditationb; Assessmentsb,d; 
Policyd,e; Organizational Securitya,d; Monitoringd; 
Reviewingd; Risk Managementd,f; Compliancee 
People 
Awareness b,c,d; Training b,c,d; Identificationb; 
Authenticationb; Personnel Securitya,b,d; Screeningc; 
Preparednessc; Responsec; Human Resourcese 
System 
Resiliency 
Contingency Planninga,b,c; Disaster Recoveryf; 
Managemente,f; Business Continuitye,f 
Operations 
Emergency Preparednessa; Risk Analysisa;  
Access Controlb,d,e,f; Incident Responseb,d;  
System Integrityb,d; Information Integrity b,d; 
Risk Assessmentb,c; Vulnerability Assessmentc; 
Software Development Securityf; Information  
Managementd,e; Document Managementd; Security 
Program Managementd; Operations Securitye,f; 
Cryptographye; Security Engineeringf; Security 
Assessmentf; Security Testingf 
Physical and 
Environmental  
Physical Securitya,b,c,d,e,f; Environmental 
Protectionb,d,e,f 
Asset 
Management 
Equipment Securitya; Software Securitya; Data 
Securitya; Configuration Managementb,c; 
Maintenanceb,d,e; Media Protectionb,d; System 
Acquisitionb,d,e; Service Acquisitionb,d; Leveraging 
Technologiesc; Cyber Critical Infrastructure 
Securityc; System Developmentd; System 
Maintenancee; Media Protectiond; Asset 
Managemente,f; Supplier Relationshipse 
Interconnectivity 
Telecommunication Securitye; System 
Protectionb,d; Communication Protectionb,d,e,f; 
Network Securityf 
References: a. 45 CFR Part 95 [21], b. FIPS 200 [22], c. Transportation 
Systems Sector-Specific Plan [23], d. Catalog of Control Systems 
Security [24], e. ISO 27002 [20], f. CISSP [19]. 
Note that systems developers (i.e., practicing Systems 
Engineers) may partition security into domains with varying 
detail and specificity. As such, the existing security domains 
may not map directly to the proposed system-agnostic 
domains; however, the goal is merely to map the domains as 
close as possible in order to represent the intention of the 
domain as described by its framework. For example, the Asset 
Management domain can be further partitioned into hardware, 
software, and operating systems to more specifically account 
for physical material and components (e.g., hard drives, car 
doors, fuselages, etc.), the mechanisms used to provide 
functionality to systems (e.g., human-machine interfaces, 
hardware logic, software applications, etc.), and the platform 
that the applications reside on (e.g., operating systems, virtual 
machines, web interfaces, etc.). The problem with this systems 
security approach, though, is the translation from one 
framework to another: the concepts are similar but often 
expressed with varying lexicon. Also, some domains may 
have interdependencies with other domains that may need to 
be considered, such as communications and network 
equipment (Interconnectivity) needing to be managed (Asset 
Management) and protected (Physical and Environmental 
security). 
A. Compliance 
Compliance addresses the security policies of the 
organization, provides the organization direction, and supports 
security in accordance with business or mission requirements, 
alongside applicable legal, statutory, and regulatory 
requirements. While many believe, security is primarily based 
on locks and walls to prevent access, there are many times 
when security depends on deterrence including the possibility 
of punishment; this is the role of policy and laws [25]. For 
example, while cars have door locks, it is often the possibility 
of a thief getting caught and sent to jail, which, while small, is 
large enough to deter all but the most determined criminals. 
As such, there are many different forms of punishment to 
include fines, ostracism, firing, jail, and other creative 
alternatives that can be incorporated into compliance policies 
and laws [25].  
This domain also serves as an important form of internal 
control to limit unwanted behaviors from employees and 
includes investigative measures to determine if an incident has 
occurred as well as the processes for responding to such 
incidents. Well-written policies convey to employees what is 
expected of them, leaving the organization free to focus on 
other security and management priorities. Additionally, 
adherence to compliance requirements also helps to maintain a 
degree of accountability in the eyes of external (and internal) 
stakeholders. 
B. People 
 Because modern systems currently, and will continue to, 
depend on people for development and operation, most 
vulnerabilities tend to occur at the human level [26], [39]. For 
example, Kevin Mitnick, a computer security consultant once 
known as the world’s most wanted hacker, stated that as “better 
security technologies, [make] it increasingly difficult to exploit 
technical vulnerabilities… attackers will turn more and more to 
exploiting the human element” [26]. His work recognizes that 
attackers pay more attention to the human element in security 
than most system developers have, and consequently hackers 
have managed to successfully exploit this advantage repeatedly 
with little investment and minimal risk. Therefore, the security 
roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third 
parties are critically important and should be defined and 
documented in accordance with the organization’s policies and 
overall competitive strategy. At a minimum, background 
checks on all potential employees should be conducted in 
accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and ethics in 
relation to the business needs and the perceived risks [20].  
 Furthermore, motivation to comply is often based on the 
users’ understanding of why their actions and behaviors can 
put organizational assets at risk [26]. Education, training, and 
certification needs to instill personal and collective 
responsibility in all users to include security designers, 
administrators, decision makers, and end users. Note there is a 
point of distinction to make between education and training: 
education is largely about teaching concepts and skills whereas 
training aims to change behavior through drill, monitoring, 
feedback, reinforcement, and punishment [26]. By 
incorporating both security education and training into every 
task the user does, the organization puts security into the 
forefront of people’s minds on a daily basis, which allows them 
to focus on the necessary actions to protect themselves, as well 
as, the organization’s data, networks, and systems. 
C. System Resiliency 
The system must also be able to continue its mission during 
critical failures while protecting its people and assets 
regardless of internal and external conflict or attacks, 
unforeseen environmental or operational changes, and system 
malfunctions [28], [29]. While each component of the system 
itself may be secure and reliable, demonstrating (or proving) 
that the whole system is resilient becomes much harder. 
System Resiliency requires processes to identify and mitigate 
design, production, test, and field support deficiencies which 
threaten mission success [27]. Additionally, resiliency with 
respect to system security also means providing justified 
confidence that the SoI security functions as only intended and 
is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or 
unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system [27].  
The complete system must meet stakeholder expectations 
and needs while also addressing their security concerns by 
performing traceability of system security requirements.  Note 
that the stakeholder requirements are the results of 
requirements analysis to transform the informal needs, 
expectations, and concerns into something that can be 
delivered.  The system requirements transform the stakeholder 
expression into the technical solution that will be delivered. 
To be effective, claims should be addressed early and 
proportionately with stakeholder needs and expected threats. 
Activities should include a planned systematic set of multi-
disciplinary activities to achieve adequate evidence for system 
resiliency and manage the risk of exploitable vulnerabilities 
[27]. Incorrectly addressing concerns late in the engineering 
process could result in the system being misused, resulting in 
unnecessary costs or delays in full system operations [27]. 
D. Operations 
 Operations security (and by extension sustainment, 
maintenance, and logistics) focuses on providing system 
availability for end users while protecting sensitive data and 
important resources [19], [20]. From a systems-level 
perspective, Operations includes the collection of mechanisms 
and procedures that allow system managers to exercise 
directive or restrictive influence over the behavior, use, and 
content of the system; however, due to the prevailing nature of 
software applications in today’s systems, it is important to note 
that fundamental cybersecurity principals from programs and 
standards such as the CISSP and the ISO/IEC 27002 have a 
large impact in securing this domain. Properties such as access 
control, cryptography, application development, and 
information security play crucial roles in keeping this domain 
secure. For example, access control permits management to 
specify what users or processes can do, which resources they 
can access, and what operations they can perform on a system 
[19].  
E. Physical and Environmental 
Physical and environmental security addresses the physical 
and procedural issues that exist in the environment in which the 
SoI is to be deployed and operated/sustained. This domain is 
concerned with the prevention of unauthorized physical access, 
damage, and interference to the system, as well as measures to 
prevent loss, damage, theft, or compromise of assets [20]. 
Some systems may require more physical security 
considerations than other systems due to a tightly coupled 
cyber-physical relationship. For example, Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) like power plants or waste water treatment 
plants are considered critical infrastructures which merit higher 
levels of physical security in order to prevent tampering. 
Similarly, classified or consolidated IT systems such as 
military networks and service delivery points may also warrant 
high levels of physical security due to the sensitive and 
important nature of the service they provide. Conversely, 
conventional organizational IT systems (e.g., servers, desktop 
computers, etc.), may not require significant physical security 
consideration because these systems are often integrated into 
larger systems or “businesses” in which physical security has 
already been provided. 
F. Asset Management 
 Asset management describes the assets that the SoI utilizes 
to operate such as people, intellectual property, system 
components, and the acquisition of such assets (i.e., supply 
chain management). This domain encompasses both high-level 
and more detailed processes, concepts, principles, structures, 
and standards used to define, design, implement, monitor, and 
secure/assure operating systems, applications, equipment, and 
networks [19]. For data components, the domain should also 
clearly integrate various levels of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability to ensure effective operations and adherence to 
governance. This domain can be further subdivided into three 
components: 
i. Hardware 
 Of the many components that compose a technological 
product, and ultimately the system, most contain elements from 
the broader global market, making it difficult to establish the 
trustworthiness and security of an end product [30]. As demand 
drives competition, many companies are forced to outsource in 
order to lower costs and remain competitive. This can be seen 
in the U.S. computer manufacturing sector, which in the first 
half of the decade has declined at an annual rate of 21.8 percent 
as computer manufacturing has increasingly moved abroad 
[30]. As manufacturers lose direct control of production quality 
and product integrity, this outsourcing process can be misused 
by others to introduce malicious logic into unsuspecting 
devices. More often than not, hardware failure or cyber-attacks 
would likely be suspected before malicious hardware, 
especially since diagnostic tests might not find proof of 
malicious actions [30]. These devices may also contain hidden 
backdoors which are equally difficult to detect. 
ii. Software 
 Software (applications or firmware) can also be subject to 
compromise as complex systems are typically implemented by 
a large number of developers across a number of companies 
[1]. In March 2013, a study by the International Data 
Corporation found that “at least a third of all PC software is 
counterfeit” because of its nonphysical nature [30], 
significantly increasing the potential for malware infection and 
application performance degradation. Conversely, sometimes 
vulnerabilities in technology are simply design or 
implementation mistakes; however, malicious or not, 
vulnerabilities in software can be, and often are, used for 
malicious ends, be it cyber-attacks or espionage [36].  
iii. Operating Systems 
 Operating systems are also subject to multiple programmers 
or outsourcing, which, like in the case of hardware and 
software, can introduce supply chain compromises. Modern 
operating systems contain millions of lines of codes with 
numerous undetected or undetectable vulnerabilities. Because 
of the crucial role of the operating system in any computing 
system, the security (or lack thereof) of an operating system 
has a significant impact on the overall security of the system, 
including the security of dependent applications (i.e., the 
software running on the operating system) [31]. Lack of proper 
control and containment of execution of individual applications 
in an operating system may lead to attack or break-in from one 
application to other applications [31]. 
G. Interconnectivity 
Communications and network security can be described as 
the cornerstones of information security, being one of the most 
central assets to the information environment of any system 
[38]. Loss of interconnectivity can have devastating 
consequences on the SoI and its ability to operate, which often 
leads to mission failure. This domain then refers to not only 
the transmission methods and security measures used to 
provide integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data 
during transfer over private and public communication 
networks but also the intercommunication between 
components within a system, such as a vehicle control area 
network bus which allows microcontrollers and other devices 
in a vehicle to communicate with each other without the 
presence of a host computer. Likewise, using the appropriate 
security protocols ensures that security and integrity of data in 
transit persist as these protocols are primarily designed to 
prevent any unauthorized user, application, service, or device 
from accessing data by implementing various cryptography 
and encryption techniques. 
IV. EXAMPLE PRIORITIZATION SCHEMES 
This section provides three example prioritization schemes 
(i.e., possible interpretations) using available frameworks to 
demonstrate the utility of the system-agnostic domains. It is 
also important to note that many organizations adopt control 
frameworks to provide a governance structure that is 
consistent, measurable, standardized, comprehensive, and 
modular [19]; however, there is often no standard or 
methodology for determining the “criticality” or importance of 
such efforts with respect to existing security domains. Thus, 
information about each domain must be considered and 
combined by SMEs to get a true understanding of its priority 
and determine proper courses of action. For example, should 
developmental and operational tests lack adequate SSE 
process controls and appropriate design features, planning and 
engineering efforts could be wasted if vulnerabilities go 
undiscovered. 
Decisions regarding when, where, and how these system-
agnostic security domains should be used are best determined 
by the specific industry sectors and the SMEs associated with 
those systems. Thus, these examples are not intended to 
replace the need for applying sound engineering judgment, 
established best practices, or risk assessments, but rather 
function as an example use case for further analysis and 
consideration for engineering complex systems. More 
specifically, we examine three well-established frameworks 
and attempt to create mappings from their criticality 
assessment back to the system-agnostic security domains 
described in Section III. In this way, we construct 
prioritization schemes that determine, based on what controls 
is assumed to matter more for the system or organization, how 
to organize the security domains in level of importance for the 
system developer.  
Note, the notion of using a weighted priority scheme (i.e., 
using multiplicative factors to influence the perceived 
importance of particular categories or domains) allows for a 
finer level of granularity and detail, but was ultimately omitted 
in this work in order to minimize the complexity of the issue 
and prevent possible obfuscation of the necessary components. 
To provide a broad systems security perspective and 
demonstrate wide applicability, we addressed security 
guidance from the conventional IT industry [32], government 
specific acquisition [15], and critical infrastructure [24]. It 
must be emphasized again that as these are sample scenarios, 
the values and order of importance may change depending on 
the background and expertise of the individual or individuals 
implementing this concept. 
A. NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 
The first example is the NIST SP 800-53r4 Security and 
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations, consisting of 285 controls in 19 families [32]. 
This publication provides for the ability to scope and tailor 
controls to an organization’s specific mission (or user 
requirements) and provides best practice recommendations for 
information security management by those initiating, 
implementing, or maintaining information security systems. By 
categorizing the 19 control families and mapping them back to 
the proposed security domains, we derive Table III. These 19 
control families are listed along the left column of Table III and 
serve as consideration or control factors to help determine how 
much a given security domain would impact or influence the 
system, as determined by the SME. While the NIST SP 800-
53r4 provides a holistic approach to information security by 
providing the breadth and depth of security controls necessary 
to fundamentally strengthen information systems and the 
environments in which those systems operate, this assessment 
looks to apply those same security control families as a set of 
defined requirements used to satisfy the system-agnostic 
security domains.  
With respect to the sums in Table III, once each control is 
associated with its respective security domains, we can assert 
that larger security domain values imply a more weighted or 
critical importance to the system utilizing this particular 
prioritization scheme. For example, the Media Protection 
control family can apply directly to the Physical and 
Environmental security domain as well as the Asset 
Management domain. For this particular scheme then, 
Compliance should be weighted more heavily than the 
commonly emphasized Operations security domain. While all 
security domains are important, this prioritization allows IT-
focused organizations to focus their resources more 
specifically. 
B. Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
In 2012, the Defense Science Board Task Force concluded 
that the cyber threat was serious and that the United States 
could not be confident that its critical information and cyber 
systems would work under sophisticated and well-resourced 
cyber attacks [40]. While the DoD takes great care to secure 
the use and operation of its weapon systems, its networks are 
built on inherently insecure architectures that are increasingly 
composed of foreign assets [40]. The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (DAG) provides details on integrating classical 
systems engineering processes for mitigating and managing 
risks to unprecedented technologies and mission-critical 
system functionality throughout the acquisition lifecycle [15]. 
More specifically, Chapter 13 of the DAG (Program 
Protection) provides detailed procedural steps in performing 
criticality analysis, the DoD’s method by which mission-
critical components and information are identified and 
prioritized. In essence, program protection seeks to defend 
warfighting capabilities by keeping secret things from getting 
out and malicious things from getting in [15], [37]. 
Leveraging this methodology, another example 
prioritization scheme is generated, as shown in Table IV. 
Here, the criticality analysis procedural steps are assessed 
against the security domains, which we treat like critical 
components and information for mission-critical functions. 
From these results, we assert that security domains with larger 
sum values imply more importance to the SoI. In this example, 
System Resiliency and Asset Management share equally high 
sum priorities of “3”. 
C. SCADA Security Policy Framework 
The final prioritization example uses the Framework for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Security 
Policy, developed by Sandia National Laboratories in an effort 
to ease the creation of SCADA security policies and ensuring 
coverage over all critical areas of SCADA security as well as 
flexibility in developing customized policies for specific 
operations [33]. Because SCADA systems are often used to 
control time-critical functions, standard IT security practices 
may not be particularly suitable for SCADA systems [33]. 
Although the framework describes a methodology to 
creating SCADA specific policy documents, the policy itself 
translates the organization’s desired security and reliability 
control objectives into enforceable direction and behavior for 
the staff to ensure secure design, implementation, and 
operation [33]. In this fashion, we strive not to explicitly 
exclude this type of framework from applicability in our 
system-agnostic approach. As shown in Table V, we can 
rationally map each category to the system-agnostic security 
domains to create a SCADA specific prioritization scheme. 
Again, the larger the sum value for a security domain implies 
more importance of that domain to the system. In this 
example, the domain of most concern is the Asset 
Management domain with a value of “4”. 
D. Implications of the SSE Domains 
Tables III, IV, and V demonstrate that the prioritization 
orders for the three system frameworks are vastly different 
from one another given these specific mappings (which 
TABLE III 
PRIORITY SCHEME FOR NIST SP 800-53R4 
NIST SP 800-53r4 Compliance People System Resiliency Operations 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Asset 
Management Interconnectivity 
Access Control X X  X   X 
Awareness and Training X X      
Audit and Accountability X X      
Security Assessment and Authorization X       
Configuration Management X     X  
Contingency Planning   X     
Identification and Authentication     X  X 
Incident Response   X  X   
Maintenance      X  
Media Protection     X X  
Physical and Environmental Protection     X   
Planning   X     
Program Management X X      
Personnel Security  X   X   
Risk Assessment X       
System and Services Acquisition      X  
System and Communication Protection    X   X 
System and Information Integrity    X   X 
Privacy Controls     X  X 
Sum 7 5 3 3 6 4 5 
 
presumably represent the stakeholders’ priorities). For 
example, the NIST SP 800-53r4 prioritizes Compliance 
whereas the DAG is more inclined to require fairly equal 
attention in System Resiliency as well as Asset Management. 
These results show that the proposed system-agnostic security 
domains can serve as a basis for further developing and 
tailoring systems specific security frameworks, processes, and 
requirements efforts. By utilizing and extending this concept 
with well-established SSE processes, activities, and tasks, we 
desire to increase understanding of SSE approaches in order to 
focus limited resources and maximize return on investment. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
This paper provides a comprehensive description of 
foundational SSE concepts and frameworks for the interested 
reader, and proposes seven system-agnostic security domains 
for consideration to prioritize and address system security 
issues in complex systems. In contrast to the preponderance of 
“cyber” focused security research, this work focuses more 
holistically on SSE in order to create a system-agnostic 
approach for various types and classes of systems to include: 
cyber-physical, transportation, weapons systems, and other 
complex systems or systems of systems. 
The abstracted domains allow users and practitioners to 
focus on systems in general as opposed to specific systems 
designed for a specialized purpose. While more attention to 
detail can be given by a SME to his/her particular system, this 
preliminary approach allows for a standard baseline to be 
created such that new practitioners in the field have a starting 
guide to developing secure systems of their own. This work 
could potentially save, at the very least, the initial cost of 
understanding the majority of non-specialized security 
requirements, to providing an effective method for prioritizing 
and quantifying such an approach for systems in development. 
 In future efforts, we desire to re-evaluate the proposed list 
of system-agnostic domains and further elaborate on them as 
well as appending overlooked domains into the current 
decomposition. We also seek to incorporate our assessment 
methods alongside NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security 
Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach 
in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems to aid in the 
development of trustworthy secure systems that are fully 
capable of supporting critical missions and business operations 
while meeting stakeholder security objectives and protection 
needs [14]. Thus, we desire to investigate the tailorable nature 
of NIST SP 800-160 and explore how to more efficiently 
apply the SSE processes, activities, and tasks to various SoI 
(e.g., smart vehicles, major weapon systems, and industrial 
control systems). Our research goal is to more fully 
understand an effective systems security approach, increase 
the manageability of SSE efforts, and provide cost effective 
SSE solutions.  
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TABLE IV 
PRIORITY SCHEME FOR THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook Compliance People System Resiliency Operations 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Asset 
Management Interconnectivity 
Missions/Mission-Essential Functions  X X   X X 
Critical Subsystems, Configuration Items, 
and Components   X   X X 
Initial Start Conditions   X X    
Operating Environment X    X   
Critical Suppliers X     X  
Sum 2 1 3 1 1 3 2 
TABLE V 
PRIORITY SCHEME FOR THE FRAMEWORK FOR SCADA SECURITY POLICY 
SCADA Security Policy Framework Compliance People System Resiliency Operations 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Asset 
Management Interconnectivity 
Data Security      X X 
Platform Security    X X X  
Communication Security    X   X 
Personnel Security  X   X   
Configuration Management X     X  
Audit X X      
Applications   X X  X  
Physical Security     X   
Manual Operations  X X     
Sum 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 
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5. A Framework for Prioritizing SSE Processes, Activities, and Tasks 
5.1. Description 
While there are many excellent security frameworks and methodologies available, 
there are few references written to equip the Systems Engineer to intelligently engage the 
established security community. This paper provides a framework for more fully 
understanding and prioritizing the application of SSE processes, activities, and tasks as 
described in the NIST SP 800-160. This work extends the system agnostic domains 
concepts introduced in chapter 4 by presenting a methodology which examines, maps, 
and prioritizes the SSE processes, activities, and tasks to the system agnostic domains.  
This paper studies explicit relationships between processes and activities as noted 
in the NIST SP 800-160 and highlights areas of interest within the NIST SP 800-160 for 
the Systems Engineer. This mapping affords the Systems Engineer another opportunity at 
further tailoring the NIST SP 800-160 to their specific needs. The resulting SSE 
framework offers a repeatable and tailorable methodology which allows system 
developers to systematically focus on particular SSE processes, activities, and tasks in 
order to support critical missions and business operations while also meeting stakeholder 
security objectives and protection needs. This framework creates a bridge between 
experts and those looking to apply state of the art SSE practices by offering a 
prioritization tool to reduce some of the decision-makers’ required knowledge and time. 
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Abstract—This paper provides a framework for more fully 
understanding the application of Systems Security Engineering 
(SSE) processes, activities, and tasks as described in the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special 
Publication 800-160. First, a Systems Engineering perspective to 
the security problem is described with an emphasis on related 
systems-oriented security methodologies. Next, a proposed SSE 
framework is presented; most importantly, it allows stakeholders 
to tailor and prioritize their SSE efforts based on protection 
needs. Lastly, three example prioritizations are detailed to 
illustrate the framework’s applicability to various systems types 
(conventional IT, cyber-physical, and major weapon systems). 
The SSE framework (included online) offers a repeatable and 
tailorable methodology which allows system developers to focus 
on high Return-on-Investment (RoI) SSE processes, activities, 
and tasks to more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs. 
 
Index Terms—Systems Security Engineering, Systems 
Engineering, Security Engineering, Security Framework 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Current security practices lack effective methodologies to 
prioritize and address system security issues in complex 
systems [1], [27]. In their recent call to arms, the Principal 
Deputy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Systems Engineering Kristen Baldwin et al. stressed the need 
for integration and formalization of security methods, 
processes, and tools into established Systems Engineering 
(SE) processes, specifically citing that one of the major 
challenges to modern programs and systems was the 
increasingly complex, dynamic, and interconnected 
interactions of systems [3]. This challenge complicates the 
ability to understand and prove that complex systems and 
Systems-of-Systems (SoS), across their execution states and 
modes, are secure.  
To address this problem, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-160 
Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a 
Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy 
Secure Systems aims to aid in developing trustworthy secure 
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systems that are fully capable of supporting critical missions 
and business operations while meeting stakeholder security 
objectives and protection needs [1]. Yet the SSE processes 
activities and tasks in NIST SP 800-160 must be applied to 
diverse classes of systems.  
This research seeks to provide a System Security 
Engineering (SSE) framework that offers a repeatable and 
tailorable methodology to system developers, allowing them 
to focus SSE processes, activities, and tasks to more 
efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs. By doing so, we 
make the following contributions: 
• A provision for mapping the SSE processes and 
activities to the system agnostic security domains 
introduced in [2] 
• A systematic application of SSE processes, activities, 
and tasks to diverse classes of systems  
• A graphical analysis on the tightly coupled nature of 
the SSE processes as presented in the NIST SP 800-160 
In Section II, a discussion of existing SSE concepts, 
methodologies, and frameworks is provided for the reader. 
Section III explores the SSE process relationships through 
graphical analysis clustering. This application identifies and 
outlines the explicit relationships between processes and 
activities presented in the NIST SP 800-160. Section IV 
introduces the SSE application framework by discussing 
domain-to-process associations and mappings. Section V 
provides a brief commentary on the implications of these 
domain mappings and the ability to express particular areas of 
interest in the NIST SP 800-160 for the Systems Engineer 
given their own specific domain prioritization. It also provides 
three examples which utilize the framework presented in 
Sections III and IV to prioritize SSE efforts. Finally, in Section 
VI, we conclude with a discussion on the interpretations of our 
work and discuss how this research agenda can be further 
explored with respect to the NIST SP 800-160. This work also 
seeks to extend the baseline knowledge of practicing systems 
security engineers and those responsible for SSE roles and 
responsibilities [5]. Note, this work extends the author’s 
previous work [2], [6], [7]. 
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 II. BACKGROUND 
Despite their focus on computer security, early works 
recognized the foundational systems nature of their task [6]. 
For example, the 1970 Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Computer Security concluded that providing satisfactory 
security controls in a computer system is itself a system design 
problem [31]. Moreover, the board specifically identified 
security as a systems problem: “a combination of hardware, 
software, communications, physical, personnel, policy, and 
procedural safeguards” [31].  
As modern systems continue to increase in size and 
complexity, systems security is not adequately addressed, 
resulting in business and mission stakeholders becoming more 
susceptible to a considerable array of disruptive events [1]. 
This is because the majority of security literature speaks to 
security only from an IT or cybersecurity perspective, (e.g., 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [8], 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) 
[9], Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria 
(CTCPEC) [10], and ISO/IEC 15408: Information technology 
— Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security 
[11]). 
Initially sponsored by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
and developed by the International Systems Security 
Engineering Association (ISSEA), the Systems Security 
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), which 
has evolved into ISO/IEC 21827, describes essential 
characteristics of engineering security processes that should 
exist in an organization in order to ensure quality security 
engineering [32], [34]. The SSE-CMM establishes a 
framework for measuring and improving performance in the 
application of security engineering principles; it can be used 
by engineering organizations to evaluate and refine security 
engineering practices, by customers to evaluate a provider’s 
security engineering capability, and by SE evaluation 
organizations to establish organizational capability-based 
confidences [33], [34].  
While the SSE-CMM delivers the necessary roadmap for 
adopting organization-wide security engineering practices, it 
does not specifically point out any tools or techniques that can 
be used to help reach the goals described in the process areas; 
rather, it is used as a means for engineering organizations to 
evaluate their security engineering practices and define 
improvements to them [33], [34]. 
Another groundbreaking work, Ross Anderson’s Security 
Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed 
Systems describes the interaction between technical 
engineering basics, security, human psychology, and usability 
[21]. At more than one thousand pages, this comprehensive 
volume details how to develop systems that stay dependable 
whether faced with error or malice. As security spans a wide 
gamut of disciplines, this book tries to bridge the gap between 
the various disciplines while avoiding unnecessary technical 
details and providing much emphasis on what can go wrong 
and what one can learn from those situations. While it does 
not specifically present a “systems-oriented” view of security, 
it highlights numerous security considerations for a number of 
distributed systems and successfully covers a wide range of 
practical security issues quite well. 
 In addition, a risk-based methodology for addressing 
security concerns in systems via the Program Protection Plan 
(PPP) [3] had been developed and applied as the basis for 
system security engineering for US Department of Defense 
(DoD) systems. In 2011, the DoD publicly acknowledged the 
need for an integrated approach for developing secure systems 
as they revitalized their SSE approach through the PPP [3], 
[25]. By identifying critical system components and assessing 
threats and vulnerabilities of these components, the Systems 
Engineer can identify and address countermeasure options for 
the system. By considering these risks in early concepts, 
requirements, and design trades for systems, SSE is being 
integrated into SE of systems [3], [35]. 
Other security frameworks, such as those used to develop 
the seven abstracted security domains described in [2], include 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 95, Subpart: F 
[12]; ISO/IEC 27002 [13]; Federal Information Processing 
Standards 200 (FIPS 200) [14]; the International Information 
System Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2 CISSP CBK 
[15]; the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, an annex to their 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan [16]; and the DHS 
Catalog of Control Systems Security for protecting critical 
infrastructure [17]. These works outline provisions for 
establishing minimum baseline or system-level security 
considerations for their respective areas. 
While there are many excellent security frameworks and 
methodologies available, there are few references written to 
equip the Systems Engineer to intelligently engage the 
established security community. Of the SSE literature 
available, only a few promote a systematic approach to SSE. 
Furthermore, due to the constant emergence of new threats and 
technologies, adopting organization wide standardization of 
security concepts and practices is becoming more critical.  
Of noteworthy importance is NIST SP 800-160, which 
provides a systematic approach to security for Systems 
Engineers and is framed around the widely accepted 
international standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [4]. Published in 
November of 2016, after 5 years of effort and significant 
reviews by subject matter experts, it is arguably the most 
comprehensive statement on SSE to date, providing 
foundational engineering considerations in the form of SSE 
processes, activities, and tasks based on well-established 
security principles, concepts, and practices. More concretely, 
NIST SP 800-160 is not a standard, prescriptive checklist, or 
formalized evaluation criteria – it is a multidisciplinary 
engineering approach which “ensures [security] requirements 
and needs are addressed with appropriate fidelity and rigor” 
[4]. For an overview of NIST SP 800-160, please see [6], [7]. 
III. INHERENT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SSE PROCESSES 
In this work, we map the relationships between the 
processes as described in the NIST SP 800-160, noting that we 
assume a non-directional relationship between the processes. 
The NIST SP 800-160 identifies and describes 30 SSE 
processes, 111 activities, and 428 tasks. While each process 
and its supporting activities and tasks can be executed as a 
standalone procedure, it is often the case that each process (or 
 one of its activities) has a connection, or relationship, with 
another process. The NIST SP 800-160 explicitly connects 
several of these processes and activities to other processes and 
activities, either as inputs or outcomes of those processes and 
activities.  
Mapping these explicit relationships, Table A-1 (see 
Appendix A) shows that many of the processes are tightly 
coupled and that no process is completely isolated from any 
other process. In other words, each process outcome 
influences or is influenced by another process, and may not 
necessarily be in the same process family. Fig. 1 details a 
relationship graph (also known as a social graph) that depicts 
the connective network between the processes of Table A-1 
[30]. As is evident in the relationship graph, all processes are 
connected in some fashion to another process.  
In analyzing the relationship between these processes, we 
examine clustering coefficient, as shown in Table 1. In graph 
theory, the clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to 
which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together; it is a real 
number between 0 and 1 in which 0 represents no clustering 
and 1 represents maximal clustering [38]. More specifically, 
evidence suggests that in most real-world networks, and in 
particular social networks, nodes tend to create tightly knit 
groups characterized by a relatively high density of ties; this 
likelihood tends to be greater than the average probability of a 
tie randomly established between two nodes [36], [37]. The 
clustering coefficient of a graph is based on a local clustering 
coefficient for each node 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = number of triangles connected to node 𝑖𝑖number of triples centered around node 𝑖𝑖   (1) 
 
where a triple centered around node i is a set of two edges 
connected to node i. Using NodeXL to calculate the clustering 
coefficient for each process (treating them as nodes with 
respect to Fig. 1), we generate the values in Table 1 [30].  
The results point to the notion that 27 of the 30 processes 
have some varying degree of connectedness with the other 
processes, with 20 of those processes having a clustering 
coefficient of 0.5 or higher. In other words, when applying any 
 
The colors partition the processes into their respective families: black represents the Technical Processes, Blue represents the Technical Management 
Processes, Green represents the Organization Project-Enabling Processes, and Orange represents the Agreement Processes 
.FIG. 1: RELATIONSHIP GRAPH OF SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING PROCESSES AS OUTLINED IN NIST SP 800-160.  
 of the SSE processes to a particular system, the system 
developer must account for possible related processes in order 
to maximize the development effort. We note that the 
clustering coefficient for Measurement, Human Resource 
Management, and Knowledge Management is 0, a value we 
expect and corresponds directly to the number of connections 
each process makes in Fig. 1 (and relationships identified in 
Table A-1). A value of 0 does not necessarily mean there are 
no connections for that node (this could instead be interpreted 
as a less complete neighborhood around that particular node). 
TABLE 1: CLUSTERING COEFFICIENTS FOR SSE PROCESSES ORDERED BY 
VALUE FROM GREATEST TO LEAST. 
Processes (Nodes) Clustering 
Coefficient 
Disposal 1.000 
Integration 0.867 
Quality Management 0.800 
Architecture Definition 0.773 
Business or Mission Analysis 0.689 
Maintenance 0.689 
Transition 0.667 
Decision Management 0.650 
Configuration Management 0.633 
Operation 0.628 
Verification 0.621 
Infrastructure Management 0.619 
Design Definition 0.590 
System Requirements Definition 0.583 
System Analysis 0.583 
Stakeholder Needs/Req Definition 0.564 
Acquisition 0.536 
Implementation 0.533 
Risk Management 0.525 
Validation 0.500 
Portfolio Management 0.476 
Information Management 0.415 
Project Assessment and Control 0.375 
Quality Assurance 0.345 
Supply 0.333 
Project Planning 0.286 
Life Cycle Model Management 0.167 
Measurement 0.000 
Human Resource Management 0.000 
Knowledge Management 0.000 
IV. DOMAIN-TO-PROCESS ASSOCIATIONS 
In order to study the efficient application of the SSE 
processes, we utilize the seven abstracted system security 
domains (Compliance, People, System Resiliency, Operations, 
Physical and Environmental, Asset Management, and 
Interconnectivity) from [2]. These domains were developed 
using existing and well-established security frameworks, 
extracting common elements described across many fields and 
specialties without being too restrictive to one specific system. 
The utility of these domains allows systems to be partitioned 
into their most basic security considerations when developing 
or modifying systems through the use of a priority scheme [2]. 
In order to better define the connection between the system 
agnostic security domains and SSE, we map each domain with 
possible SSE processes and activities from the NIST SP 800-
160. In doing so, we create a customizable framework for 
stakeholders and Systems Engineers to tailor and prioritize 
their SSE efforts based on protection needs. 
Utilizing past and present experiences and efforts of 
systems-related works such as [3], [4] and security-related 
works including [5], [6], [7], we interpret the NIST SP 800-
160 literature descriptions of the 30 processes and 111 
activities and match each activity to the corresponding system 
agnostic security domain(s) [2] most closely associated with 
that activity to build Table B-1 (see Appendix B). We map the 
activities here because we determined that the processes 
themselves do not provide enough detail for association 
whereas the tasks are perhaps too detailed for our purposes. 
The results are normalized on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 
having no association or relation and 1 being highly associated 
or having a strong relation between the domain and the 
process in question. That is, the more activities that are 
associated to a given domain, the higher the correlation value 
of the parent process or “hit rate” for that domain. We assume 
that each positive association (i.e., each connection between a 
domain and an activity) increases the overall relationship 
between that domain and the activity’s parent process. Note 
that as this mapping is the authors’ preliminary effort at 
correlating between the domains and the literature, the 
information presented in the table may not necessarily be 
complete or entirely correct in its current form. It serves as an 
initial baseline for discussion, and may be complicated by the 
high degree of connectivity between independently managed 
systems where formal assessments can often be prohibited by 
the affected systems’ management [23]. Additional 
elaboration or evaluation is needed as future efforts continue. 
In Table 2, the SSE naming convention, as described by the 
NIST SP 800-160, is established for the system life cycle 
processes [4]. Each process is identified by a two-character 
designation.  
Plotting the developed relationships into a radar chart 
(shown in Figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5), we are able to observe the 
relative values (or levels of associativity) between each 
domain and the NIST SP 800-160 SSE processes. This allows 
us to infer, given no previous bias (i.e., we assume that all 
processes, activities, and tasks were given similar and fair 
assessment by the authors and reviewers of NIST SP 800-160 
and are equally important in the SSE approach), what specific 
process areas to explore given a specific domain of interest. 
Because the system life cycle processes are organized and 
grouped into four families in the NIST SP 800-160, the radar 
charts are organized as such to provide a similar perspective. 
Fig. 2 is the Technical Processes, Fig. 3 is the Technical 
Management Processes, Fig. 4 is the Organization Project-
Enabling Processes, and Fig. 5 is the Agreement Processes. 
Note, because the Agreement Processes family only contains 
two processes, Fig. 5 is displayed with the information in 
reverse to better display the result. 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 2: PROCESS NAMES AND DESIGNATORS. 
ID Process ID Process 
AQ Acquisition MS Measurement 
AR Architecture Definition OP Operation 
BA Business or Mission Analysis PA Project Assessment and Control 
CM Configuration Management PL Project Planning 
DE Design Definition PM Portfolio Management 
DM Decision Management QA Quality Assurance 
DS Disposal QM Quality Management 
HR Human Resource Management RM Risk Management 
IF Infrastructure Management SA System Analysis 
IM Information Management SN 
Stakeholder Needs and 
Requirements Definition 
IN Integration SP Supply 
IP Implementation SR System Requirements Definition 
KM Knowledge Management TR Transition 
LM Life Cycle Model Management VA Validation 
MA Maintenance VE Verification 
 
 
FIG. 2: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
TECHNICAL PROCESSES. 
 
 
FIG. 3: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES. 
 
 
FIG. 4: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES. 
 
  
FIG. 5: CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW OF SSE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
AGREEMENT PROCESSES. 
 
To better understand Figs. 2–5, consider a scenario in which 
the stakeholder (or project manager) considers Physical and 
Environmental Security to be the system’s highest security 
concern. From Fig. 2, we note that the Technical Process that 
most closely concerns the Physical and Environmental 
Security domain is Maintenance, with Architecture Definition, 
Integration, Verification, Transition, and Validation falling 
closely behind. Continuing with Figs. 3 and 4, we can see that 
the Technical Management Processes that most closely 
concerns the Physical and Environmental Security domain is 
Quality Assurance while the Organization Project-Enabling 
Processes point to Quality Management. The Agreement 
Processes, from Fig. 5, shows no association to Physical and 
Environmental Security. These processes have the highest 
correlation or “hit rate” values for their specific process 
family. Consequently, from the initial list of 30 SSE 
processes, the Physical and Environment Security domain has 
narrowed the system security engineer’s focus down to eight 
first level SSE processes of concern, as shown in Table 3. 
We can then use Fig. 1 (and Table A-1) to determine the 
processes related to these eight. Accounting for the duplicates 
in the additional processes provided, our final list of processes 
associated with the Physical and Environmental Security 
domain include: Maintenance, Architecture Definition, 
Integration, Verification, Transition, Validation, Quality 
Management, Quality Assurance, Project Assessment and 
Control, Decision Management, Risk Management, 
Configuration Management, Information Management, Life 
Cycle Model Management, and Infrastructure Management 
processes. Of these 15 processes, the first eight were 
determined directly by the domain association to the NIST SP 
800-160 whereas the remaining seven were obtained using 
explicit process relationships identified in Table A-1. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF THE PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 
DOMAIN ASSOCIATED PROCESSES AND THEIR RELATED PROCESSES. 
First Level 
Processes Related Processes 
Maintenance 
Validation; Operation; Design Management; 
Configuration Management; Information Management; 
Quality Assurance; Quality Management 
Architecture 
Definition 
Validation; Decision Management; Risk Management; 
Configuration Management; Information Management 
Integration 
Verification; Validation; Project Assessment and Control; 
Decision Management; Risk Management; Configuration 
Management; Information Management 
Verification 
Validation; Project Assessment and Control; Decision 
Management; Risk Management; Configuration 
Management; Information Management; Quality 
Assurance 
Transition 
Validation; Operation; Project Assessment and Control; 
Decision Management; Risk Management; Configuration 
Management; Information Management 
Validation 
Project Assessment and Control; Decision Management; 
Risk Management; Configuration Management; 
Information Management; Quality Assurance 
Quality 
Management 
Project Planning; Project Assessment and Control; Quality 
Assurance 
Quality 
Assurance 
Information Management; Life Cycle Model Management; 
Infrastructure Management 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATION EXAMPLES 
The mapping of the system agonistic domains to the SSE 
processes via its activities marks an attempt to focus the 
Systems Engineer to specific issues or considerations during 
system development. The more associated activities a process 
has to a domain, the higher the chance that the process will 
outweigh other processes in terms of importance using this 
methodology. In doing so, this approach provides a repeatable 
mechanism for the engineer to quickly determine the most 
important SSE processes (in the context of their particular 
system) when using the NIST SP 800-160 as a guideline for 
secure system development. Of important note is that not all of 
the activities and tasks in a particular process map directly to a 
domain, but rather provide a starting point for focusing when 
developing and maintaining systems. Similarly, tasks and 
activities in “non-important” (remaining) processes should 
also be considered when time and resources allow as this 
approach provides a foundational approach to the issue, rather 
than an all-encompassing solution. 
For example, while the first level processes (those 
determined using the domain-to-process mappings) 
determined by domain association should take precedence 
based on the system’s own criticality factors, the related 
processes (or second level processes) add an additional layer 
of consideration for developing sustainably secure systems. 
Moreover, duplicate process listings do not necessarily 
indicate that those processes are more important or that more 
resources should be allocated towards those process areas; 
they are a byproduct of various associations and relations that 
each process shares with other processes. Further examination 
and analysis needs to be conducted in order to provide an 
accurate interpretation of the nature of duplicate processes. 
Next, the three examples provided in [2] (conventional IT 
industry [24], government specific acquisition [25], and 
critical infrastructure [26]) are extended through the use of the 
methodologies outlined in Sections III and IV. Decisions 
regarding when, where, and how these system agnostic 
 security domains and their interpretations should be used are 
best determined by the specific industry sectors and the 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) associated with those systems. 
Thus, these examples are not intended to replace the need for 
applying sound engineering judgment, established best 
practices, or risk assessments, but rather function as example 
use cases for further analysis and consideration for 
engineering complex systems. In this way, it was possible to 
construct prioritization schemes that determine, based on what 
controls is assumed to matter more for the system or 
organization, how to organize the security domains in level of 
importance for the system developer [2]. 
A. NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 
The first example is the NIST SP 800-53R4 Security and 
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations, consisting of 285 controls in 19 families [24]. 
This publication provides for the ability to scope and tailor 
controls to an organization’s specific mission (or user 
requirements) and provides best practice recommendations for 
information security management by those initiating, 
implementing, or maintaining information security systems. 
Using the NIST SP 800-53R4 prioritization scheme [2], the 
domains list by “order of importance” are: Compliance; 
Physical and Environmental; People and Interconnectivity; 
Asset Management; and System Resiliency and Operations. 
Applying the domain-to-process methodology to the 
Compliance domain, we determine the associated processes 
from each of the families, summarized in Table 4. Figs. 6, 7, 
and 8 display modified versions of Figs. 2, 3, and 4, 
highlighting only the domain of interest (Compliance). 
Similar to the sample scenario, highlighting the processes in 
the relationship graph allows us to extrapolate another level 
deeper into related processes. Accounting for duplicates, the 
list of related processes reduces down to (in no particular 
order): Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition, 
System Analysis, Maintenance, Supply, Quality Assurance, 
Human Resource Management, and Measurement. Table 5 
shows the finalized list of first level processes obtained by 
using the domain-to-process mapping methodology as well as 
the second level related processes from the associated 
relationship graph. It should be again noted that the first level 
processes, given the methodology provided, should take 
precedence over the related processes in terms of time and 
resources due to the direct relationship that the first level 
processes have with the domain, as opposed to the acquired 
relationship of the related processes. 
TABLE 4: NIST SP 800-5R4 FIRST LEVEL PROCESSES. 
Process Families Compliance 
Technical 
Processes 
Business or Mission Analysis; System Requirements 
Definition; Architecture Definition; Design Definition; 
Implementation; Integration; Verification; Transition; 
Validation; Operation; Disposal 
Technical 
Management 
Processes 
Project Planning; Project Assessment and Control; 
Decision Management; Risk Management; 
Configuration Management; Information Management 
Organization 
Project-Enabling 
Processes 
Life Cycle Model Management; Infrastructure 
Management; Portfolio Management; Quality 
Management; Knowledge Management 
Agreement 
Processes Acquisition 
 
FIG. 6: OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
TECHNICAL PROCESSES. 
 
 
FIG. 7: OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES. 
 
  
FIG. 8: OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES. 
TABLE 5: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF NIST SP 800-53R4 SUGGESTED PROCESSES. 
First Level Processes (by domain 
association) 
Related Processes (by explicit 
relationship) 
Business or Mission Analysis 
System Requirements Definition 
Architecture Definition 
Design Definition 
Implementation 
Integration 
Verification 
Transition 
Validation 
Operation 
Disposal 
Project Planning 
Project Assessment and Control 
Decision Management 
Risk Management 
Configuration Management 
Information Management 
Life Cycle Model Management 
Infrastructure Management 
Portfolio Management 
Quality Management 
Knowledge Management 
Acquisition 
Stakeholder Needs and Requirements 
Definition 
System Analysis 
Maintenance 
Supply 
Quality Assurance 
Human Resource Management 
Measurement 
 
In this example, 23 of the 30 processes are identified by the 
Compliance domain. Adding in the related processes, all 30 
are identified. This, however, does not mean that Compliance 
should be considered the most important of all domains. 
Conversely, it identifies that this specific domain reaches 
across all processes and activities in some manner and should 
be further scrutinized and evaluated for its specific system. It 
also points to an area in the methodology that requires 
additional research and considerations in order to provide the 
user more actionable items and results. 
B. Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
The next example examines Chapter 13 of the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) [25], which provides detailed 
procedural steps in performing criticality analysis, the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) method by which mission-
critical components and information are identified and 
prioritized. In essence, this program protection concept seeks 
to defend warfighting capabilities by keeping secret things 
from getting out and malicious things from getting in [25], 
[22]. The DAG provides details on integrating classical 
Systems Engineering processes for mitigating and managing 
risks to unprecedented technologies and mission-critical 
system functionality throughout the acquisition lifecycle [25]. 
Using the DAG prioritization scheme from [2], the domains 
list by “order of importance” are: System Resiliency and Asset 
Management; Compliance and Interconnectivity; and finally 
People, Operations, and Physical and Environmental. 
Applying the domain-to-process methodology to the System 
Resiliency and Asset Management domains, we can determine 
the associated processes from each of the families, 
summarized in Table 6. Figs. 9, 10, and 11 display modified 
versions of Figs. 2, 3, and 4, highlighting only the domains of 
interest (System Resiliency and Asset Management). Note that 
System Resiliency and Asset Management were prioritized 
equally in the aforementioned scheme. 
Exploring the processes in the relationship graph and 
accounting for duplicates, the list of related processes reduces 
down to (in no particular order): Decision Management, 
Configuration Management, Stakeholder Needs and 
Requirements Definition; System Requirements Definition, 
System Analysis, Operation, Disposal, Supply, Project 
Assessment and Control, Quality Assurance, Quality 
Management, and Business or Mission Analysis. Table 7 
shows the finalized list of first level processes obtained by 
using the domain-to-process mapping methodology as well as 
the second level related processes from the associated 
relationship graph. 
In this example, we identified that 25 of the 30 processes 
should have some consideration based on the prioritization of 
System Resiliency and Asset Management. Perhaps more 
realistically, an initial approach could focus directly on the 13 
first level processes (and perhaps even prioritize those 
processes themselves to determine which has more importance 
in the context of the system) and only attempt to address the 
related processes as needed or as time and resources allow. 
For instance, we can construct a new “hybrid” graph that 
provides additional information by aggregating the domains’ 
values (or the values of their process “hit rates”). Figs. 12, 13, 
and 14 show that by focusing on the processes in this manner, 
we can narrow the list to: Validation, Verification, Risk 
Management, and Infrastructure Management. This is not to 
say that these processes are of more importance; rather, these 
processes have a higher correlation value given our particular 
association scheme and may prove to be a reasonable starting 
point for considering the large number of identified processes. 
 
 
 
 TABLE 6: DAG FIRST LEVEL PROCESSES. 
Process Families System Resiliency Asset Management 
Technical 
Processes 
Verification; 
Validation 
Architecture Definition; Design 
Definition; Implementation; 
Integration; Verification; Transition; 
Validation; Maintenance 
Technical 
Management 
Processes 
Risk 
Management Information Management 
Organization 
Project-Enabling 
Processes 
Life Cycle 
Model 
Management 
Infrastructure Management 
Agreement 
Processes N/A Acquisition 
 
 
 
FIG. 9: OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM RESILIENCY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT 
DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE TECHNICAL PROCESSES. 
 
 
 
FIG. 10: OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM RESILIENCY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT 
DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES. 
 
 
FIG. 11: OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM RESILIENCY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT 
DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE ORG. PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES. 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 7: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF DAG SUGGESTED PROCESSES. 
First Level Processes (by domain 
association) 
Related Processes (by explicit 
relationship) 
Architecture Definition 
Design Definition 
Implementation 
Integration 
Verification 
Transition 
Validation 
Maintenance 
Risk Management 
Information Management 
Life Cycle Model Management 
Infrastructure Management 
Acquisition 
Decision Management 
Configuration Management 
Stakeholder Needs and Requirements 
Definition System Requirements 
Definition 
System Analysis 
Operation 
Disposal 
Supply 
Project Assessment and Control 
Quality Assurance 
Quality Management 
Business or Mission Analysis 
 
 
 
FIG. 12: AGGREGATED OVERVIEW OF DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
TECHNICAL PROCESSES. 
 
 
FIG. 13: AGGREGATED OVERVIEW OF DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES. 
 
 
FIG. 14: AGGREGATED OVERVIEW OF DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SSE 
ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES. 
 
 
 
 
 C. SCADA Security Policy Framework 
The final prioritization example uses the Framework for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Security 
Policy, developed by Sandia National Laboratories in an effort 
to ease the creation of SCADA security policies and ensuring 
coverage over all critical areas of SCADA security as well as 
flexibility in developing customized policies for specific 
operations [26]. The domains list by “order of importance” for 
this example are: Asset Management; People, Operations, 
Physical and Environmental; and finally Compliance, System 
Resiliency, and Interconnectivity [2]. Applying the same 
methodology as before to the Asset Management domain 
gives us Table 8 and Figs. 15, 16, and 17. Similarly, Table 9 
summarizes the second level related processes. 
In this example, 11 of the 30 processes are identified, 
providing the Systems Engineer a reasonable starting point in 
tailoring the NIST SP 800-160 toward developing a verifiably 
secure SCADA system. Like before, the 14 related processes 
provide supplementary direction for secure development, 
given additional time and resources. 
TABLE 8: SCADA FRAMEWORK FIRST LEVEL PROCESSES. 
Process Families Asset Management 
Technical Processes 
Architecture Definition; Design Definition; 
Implementation; Integration; Verification; 
Transition; Validation; Maintenance 
Technical 
Management 
Processes 
Information Management 
Organization Project-
Enabling Processes Infrastructure Management 
Agreement Processes Acquisition 
 
 
FIG. 15: OVERVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH 
SSE TECHNICAL PROCESSES. 
 
 
FIG. 16: OVERVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH 
SSE TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES. 
 
FIG. 17: OVERVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT DOMAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH 
SSE ORGANIZATION PROJECT-ENABLING PROCESSES. 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 9: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF SCADA FRAMEWORK SUGGESTED 
PROCESSES. 
First Level Processes (by domain 
association) 
Related Processes (by explicit 
relationship) 
Architecture Definition 
Design Definition 
Implementation 
Integration 
Verification 
Transition 
Validation 
Maintenance 
Information Management 
Infrastructure Management 
Acquisition 
Decision Management 
Risk Management 
Configuration Management 
Stakeholder Needs and Requirements 
Definition 
System Requirements Definition 
System Analysis 
Operation 
Disposal 
Supply 
Project Assessment and Control 
Quality Assurance 
Quality Management 
Business or Mission Analysis 
 
D. Observations 
These three examples demonstrate that the “most 
important” processes when tailoring the NIST SP 800-160 for 
the three system frameworks are vastly different from one 
another given the specific prioritization mappings (which 
presumably represent the stakeholders’ priorities). 
We also noted that in the first example, the NIST SP 800-
53R4, that Compliance was the dominant domain of interest 
given the prioritization scheme presented in [2]. With it, all 30 
processes were highlighted as being associated with the 
domain through first level and second level relationships. 
While this result may not provide initial actionable 
information for the Systems Engineer, it does offer 
substantiation that Compliance plays a role in all SSE 
activities and must be considered under most, if not all, 
circumstances. Motivation to comply is often based on the 
users’ understanding of why their actions and behaviors can 
put organizational assets at risk [28].  
The second example using the DAG emphasized the fact 
that prioritizing multiple domains may initially highlight too 
many processes of interest for the Systems Engineer. By 
aggregating their associative sums, however, we were able to 
identify which processes appeared more consistently across 
the various domains and able to offer the Systems Engineer a 
more targeted approach at tailorability, identifying four of the 
30 processes. The final example, the Sandia National Labs 
SCADA Framework, initially highlighted 11 of the 30 
processes for consideration. By focusing on these 11, the 
Systems Engineer can prioritize their SSE efforts to develop a 
verifiably secure system with an emphasis on Asset 
Management security. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As current security practices often lack effective 
methodologies to determine, prioritize, and address system 
security issues in complex systems, this paper proposes an 
innovative approach towards the efficient application of SSE 
processes, activities, and tasks. It does so by offering a 
mapping to the processes and activities listed in the NIST SP 
800-160 as well as providing direct relationships between the 
processes and activities to allow for further development 
opportunities for the Systems Engineer. Finally, this work 
demonstrates the utility of the domain-to-process mappings 
with three example scenarios.  
While the tools and expertise that enable systems engineers 
to obtain information about the events such as attack paths, 
likelihood of successful compromise, and the nature and 
severity of the event exists, information about the potential 
risk to a system is not readily available using any tools or 
software [29]. Some prioritization can be performed, but uses 
the human decision-maker’s internal knowledge that is 
different for each decision-maker; this requires proficient 
domain knowledge and substantial time [29]. Our proposed 
framework attempts to create a bridge between the experts and 
those looking to eventually delve into SSE practices by 
offering an initial tool for prioritization that complements 
much of the decision-maker’s required knowledge and time 
through this initial research.  
In future work, we desire to further analyze the domain-to-
process mapping and relationship in order to better depict a 
more accurate (and more correct) correlation between the 
system agnostic domains and the NIST SP 800-160. 
Additionally, we hope to apply this methodology and 
framework to a working system, such as a vehicle or avionics 
system, in order to test its validity and adjust our framework 
based on these real-world findings. Finally, we would like to 
be able to provide additional insight into duplicate process 
listings, as this current effort (save for the second example) 
treats all processes equally for the purposes of this research 
activity. Doing so may provide a more detailed approach at 
domain criticality or process importance for the Systems 
Engineer and brings us closer to fully understanding an 
effective systems security approach, increase the 
manageability of SSE efforts, and provide cost effective SSE 
solutions. 
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 APPENDIX A 
TABLE A-1: INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING PROCESSES AS IDENTIFIED IN NIST SP 800-160. 
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Business or 
Mission Analysis  x    x     x      x x x x           
Stakeholder Needs/ 
Req Definition x     x     x      x  x x           
System Req 
Definition    x x x x    x        x x           
Architecture 
Definition x x x x x x     x      x x x x           
Design Definition  x x x  x x x  x x x x x     x x           
System Analysis           x        x x           
Implementation         x  x        x x    x     x x 
Integration    x x x   x  x     x x x x x           
Verification   x        x     x x x x x  x         
Transition      x x    x x    x x x x x           
Validation      x          x x x x x  x         
Operation           x     x x x x x  x         
Maintenance      x     x x     x  x x  x     x    
Disposal           x                    
Project Planning                x    x    x  x     
Project Assessment 
and Control     x x           x x   x x x      x x 
Decision  
Management      x            x  x           
Risk Management      x         x x x   x           
Configuration 
Management      x   x x x      x x             
Information 
Management x x                 x            
Measurement                               
Quality Assurance  x x                 x   x x       
Life Cycle Model 
Management                    x           
Infrastructure 
Management         x x x         x           
Portfolio 
Management x x    x         x  x x     x        
Human Resource 
Management                               
Quality 
Management               x x      x         
Knowledge 
Management                          x     
Acquisition  x x       x x x    x  x             
Supply x               x  x             
 APPENDIX B 
TABLE B-1: NORMALIZED DOMAIN-TO-PROCESS ASSOCIATIONS. 
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Technical Processes 
Business or Mission Analysis 1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Prepare for the security aspects of business or mission analysis x       Define the security aspects of the problem or opportunity space x  X x    Characterize the security aspects of the solution space x x x x x x x 
Evaluate and select solution classes x  x x    Manage the security aspects of business or mission analysis x      x 
Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition 0.83 0.67 0.33 0.67 033 0.5 0.67 
Prepare for stakeholder protection needs and security requirements definition x x      Define stakeholder protection needs x x x x x x x 
Develop the security aspects of operational and other life cycle concepts  x  x   x Transform stakeholder protection needs into security requirements x x x x x x x 
Analyze stakeholder security requirements x   x    Manage stakeholder protection needs and security requirements definition x     x x 
System Requirements Definition 1 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Prepare for system security requirements definition x   x x   Define system security requirements x x x x x x x 
Analyze system security in system requirements x   x    Manage system security requirements x     x x 
Architecture Definition 1 0.5 0.83 0.83 0.67 1 1 
Prepare for architecture definition from the security viewpoint x x x x  x x Develop security viewpoints of the architecture x x x x x x x 
Develop security models and security views of candidate architectures x x x x x x x 
Relate security views of the architecture to design x  x x x x x Select candidate architecture x  x x x x x Manage the security view of the selected architecture x     x x 
Design Definition 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 1 0.75 
Prepare for security design definition x  x x  x x Establish security design characteristics and enablers for each system element x x x x x x x 
Assess the alternatives for obtaining security-relevant system elements x   x  x  Manage the security design x     x x 
System Analysis 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0 0.33 0.67 
Prepare for the security aspects of system analysis x x x x    Perform the security aspects of system analysis   x x   x Manage the security aspects of system analysis x     x x 
Implementation 1 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 1 1 
Prepare for the security aspects of implementation x    x x x Perform the security aspects of implementation x x  x  x x Manage results of the security aspects of implementation x     x x 
Integration 1 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 1 
Prepare for the security aspects of integration x    x x x Perform the security aspects of integration x x x x x x x 
Manage results of the security aspects of integration x  x x  x x 
Verification 1 0.67 1 1 0.67 1 1 
Prepare for the security aspects of verification x x x x x x x 
Perform security-focused verification x x x x x x x 
Manage results of security-focused verification x  x x  x x 
Transition 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 1 
Prepare for the security aspects of transition x x   x x x Perform the security aspects of transition x x x x x x x 
Manage results of the security aspects of transition x  x x  x x 
Validation 1 0.67 1 1 0.67 1 1 
Prepare for the security aspects of validation x x x x x x x 
Perform security-focused validation x x x x x x x 
Manage results of security-focused validation x  x x  x x 
 Operation 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Prepare for secure operation x x x x    Perform secure operation x x x x x x x 
Manage results of secure operation x x x x x x x 
Support security needs of customers x x      
Maintenance 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 
Prepare for the security aspects of maintenance x   x x x  Perform the security aspects of maintenance x x x x x x x 
Perform the security aspects of logistics support      x x Manage results of the security aspects of maintenance and logistics x  x x x x x 
Disposal 1 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 1 
Prepare for the security aspects of disposal x x    x x Perform the security aspects of disposal x x x x x x x 
Finalize the security aspects of disposal x      x Technical Management Processes 
Project Planning 1 0.67 0.33 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Define the security aspects of the project x   x    Plan the security aspects of the project and technical management x x x x x x x 
Activate the security aspects of the project x x  x    
Project Assessment and Control 1 0.33 0.33 0.67 0 0.33 0.33 
Plan for the security aspects of project assessment and control x  x x    Assess the security aspects of the project x   x    Control the security aspects of the project x x    x x 
Decision Management 1 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 1 
Prepare for decisions with security implications x x    x x Analyze the security aspects of decision information x x x x x x x 
Make and manage security decisions x      x 
Risk Management 1 0.6 1 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Plan security risk management x  x x  x  Manage the security aspects of the risk profile x  x    x Analyze security risk x x x x x x x 
Treat security risk x x x x x x x 
Monitor security risk x x x x    
Configuration Management 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.83 1 
Plan for the security aspects of configuration management x x    x x Perform the security aspects of configuration identification x x    x x Perform security configuration change management x     x x Perform security configuration status accounting x     x x Perform security configuration evaluation x     x x Perform the security aspects of release control x      x 
Information Management 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Prepare for the security aspects of information management x x    x x Perform the security aspects of information management x x    x x 
Measurement 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Prepare for security measurement       x Perform security measurement       x 
Quality Assurance 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 1 
Prepare for security quality assurance x x x x x x x 
Perform product or service security evaluations     x x x Perform process security evaluations x x   x x x Manage quality assurance security records and reports x      x Treat security incidents and problems x x   x x x Organization Project-Enabling Processes 
Life Cycle Model Management 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Establish the security aspects of the process x  x     Assess the security aspects of the process x  x     Improve the security aspects of the process x  x     
Infrastructure Management  1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 
Establish the secure infrastructure x   x x x x Maintain the secure infrastructure x x x x x x x 
Portfolio Management 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Define and authorize the security aspects of projects x x x x x x x 
Evaluate the security aspects of the portfolio of projects x x x x x x x 
Terminate projects x       
Human Resource Management 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Identify systems security engineering skills  x  x    Develop systems security engineering skills x x  x    Acquire and provide systems security engineering skills to projects x x  x    
 Quality Management 1 1 0 1 0 0.33 0.33 
Plan security quality management x x  x  x  Assess security quality management x x  x    Perform security quality management corrective and preventive actions x x  x   x 
Knowledge Management 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0.5 0 
Plan security knowledge management x x x x  x  Share security knowledge and skills throughout the organization x x x x    Share security knowledge assets throughout the organization x x x x  x  Manage security knowledge, skills, and knowledge assets x       Agreement Processes 
Acquisition 1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 1 0.6 
Prepare for security aspects of the acquisition x  x x  x  Advertise the acquisition and select the supplier to conform with the security aspects of 
the acquisition x x    x x 
Establish and maintain the security aspects of agreements x     x x Monitor the security aspects of agreements x  x x  x x Accept the product or service x     x  
Supply 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.8 0 0.6 0 
Prepare for the security aspects of the supply x  x x  x  Respond to a solicitation  x  x  x  Establish and maintain the security aspects of agreements x  x x    Execute the security aspects of agreements x       Deliver and support the security aspects of the product or service x   x  x  
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6. Discussion 
6.1. Conclusions of Research 
In examining SSE concepts and developing a framework for understanding, 
prioritizing, and applying SSE processes, activities, and tasks, the intended purpose of 
this research effort endeavored to address three research questions: 
1. How can SSE be understood and described with respect to established 
Systems Engineering processes? 
2. How can SSE efforts be decomposed into universally applicable systems 
security domains? 
3. How can SSE processes, activities, and tasks be prioritized and applied to 
diverse classes of systems? 
In order to answer the first question, a comprehensive overview of prevailing SSE 
concepts and practices is required. To determine the current status of SSE, it is imperative 
to appreciate the historical context under which SSE was developed and to understand its 
evolution over the years in order to satisfy various requirements. The articles “A 
Foundation for Developing Sustainably Secure Systems” and “Putting the ‘Systems’ in 
Security Engineering” discusses the history of notable systems-oriented security 
publications and its culmination in the NIST SP 800-160 [1], [2]. 
With the historical context discussed, these two articles proceed to elaborate on 
developing a multidisciplinary engineering approach which ensures security requirements 
and needs are addressed with appropriate fidelity and rigor by aligning with the 30 
Systems Engineering life cycle processes of ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 (discussed in the NIST 
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SP 800-160) to address system security considerations throughout the entire system life 
cycle [3]. 
The second research question is answered in the article “System-Agnostic 
Security Domains for Understanding and Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering 
Efforts,” where seven abstracted systems security domains are proposed to broadly 
describe a “universal” approach for understanding and categorizing systems security 
concerns into distinct domains. The article also demonstrates the utility of the proposed 
system agnostic domains with three example prioritization schemes based on the 
importance (or criticality) of each security domain, allowing an organization to determine 
which domains are more important and therefore warrant more resources. For example, 
three well-established security frameworks (Cyber, ICS, and DoD) were examined and 
used to create mappings from their particular characteristics and system properties back 
to the system agnostic security domains. This research effort resulted in the construction 
of prioritization schemes that determine how to organize the security domains in level of 
importance for the system developer based on what controls are assumed to matter more 
for the system or organization [4]. In doing so, the researchers’ work provides essential 
knowledge for understanding how to more effectively apply SSE processes for 
engineering trustworthy and secure systems. 
In response to the third research question, the researcher looked into how SSE 
processes, activities, and tasks can be systematically applied to diverse classes of 
systems. In the article “A Framework for Prioritizing Systems Security Engineering 
Processes, Activities, and Tasks,” several existing frameworks were explored and 
introduced discussions for effectively applying the SSE processes, activities, and tasks 
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described in the NIST SP 800-160 were introduced. The first involved a graphical 
analysis on the tightly coupled nature of the SSE processes as presented in the NIST SP 
800-160, while the second provided an initial provision for mapping the SSE processes 
and activities to the system agnostic security domains introduced in [4]. As a result, this 
work uniquely offers a systematic application of SSE processes, activities, and tasks to 
diverse classes of systems, culminating in a repeatable and tailorable methodology which 
allows system developers to focus on high return on investment SSE processes, activities, 
and tasks to more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs. 
6.2. Significance of Research 
With the development of increasingly complex systems, Systems Engineers need 
to be concerned with addressing stakeholder security needs and objectives in a systematic 
way to deliver trustworthy secure systems. This research offers the community a look 
into recent developments in the field of SSE in order to provide an approach which 
ensures networked systems operate properly despite uncertain environments, malicious 
and non-malicious disruptions, and intelligent adversaries. While the NIST SP 800-160 
delivers a first-of-its-kind, systems-oriented approach to ensuring stakeholder security 
requirements and protection needs are met with appropriate fidelity and rigor [2], this 
research provides a directed methodology for efficiently applying the NIST SP 800-160. 
Additionally, in recommending the seven systems agnostic security domains, this 
research provides an approach for universally understanding and categorizing systems 
security concerns [4]. These abstracted domains serve as a common baseline for 
implementing SSE while thoroughly understanding and discussing the system security 
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problem in addition to building confidence in inter-organizational activities such as 
developing security standards and effective security practices [4].  
While the tools and expertise that enable Systems Engineers to obtain information 
about security events such as attack paths, likelihood of successful compromise, and the 
nature and severity of the event exists, information about the potential risk to a system is 
not readily available using any tools or software [6]. Thus deductions are drawn, 
primarily from the human decision-maker’s internal knowledge, which is different for 
each decision-maker, requires expert domain knowledge, substantial time, and is error 
prone [6]. The proposed framework attempts to create a bridge between experts and those 
looking to apply state of the art SSE practices by offering a prioritization tool to reduce 
some of the decision-makers’ required knowledge and time. 
Furthermore, of the three key decision making processes for acquiring DoD 
weapon systems (requirements determination, resource allocation, and the acquisition 
management system), this framework focuses most directly on resource allocation by 
offering a systematic application of SSE processes, activities, and tasks to allow system 
developers more efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs and providing a prioritized 
approach to securing major weapon systems, some of which cost hundreds of millions or 
billions of dollars to design, develop, and field [7].  
6.3. Recommendations for Future Research 
The initial designs for this research were heavily constrained by available time 
and resources for what is primarily a proof of concept. In laying the foundation for this 
system agnostic framework, however, an opportunity is created for further analysis and 
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research in this topic. One such consideration for additional investigation, for example, 
would be applying this methodology and framework to a working system, such as a 
vehicle or avionics system, in order to test its validity and update the framework based on 
these real-world findings. With initiatives such as the U.S. Air Force’s Task Force Cyber 
Secure (designed to synchronize multiple efforts and studies attempting to address 
cybersecurity and focus operations to increasing robustness and resilience of critical Air 
Force systems for core missions in and through cyberspace), using this framework in a 
government program office or commercial sector may provide a more detailed 
understanding of domain criticality or process importance for the Systems Engineer and 
potentially brings us closer to fully developing an effective systems security approach to 
increase the manageability of SSE efforts and provide cost effective SSE solutions [7], 
[8]. 
Another consideration would be the reevaluation of the current list of seven 
system agnostic domains. The present list is only merely interpretation of the most 
important aspects of current systems and existing security frameworks. Further 
elaboration or additional domains could, and should, be considered when using this 
original concept for continuing research to create a more accurate (and more correct) 
correlation between the system agnostic domains and the NIST SP 800-160, especially if 
viable applications and results could be gained from the aforementioned real-work 
applications. Likewise, future research could reevaluate the current domain-to-process 
mapping. The provided mapping is only one possible constructive effort and may not 
necessarily be the most correct mapping. Further analysis or different interpretations 
would likely produce results that provide value to the system developer. In addition, the 
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current mapping is constructed by associating domains to processes via their activities. 
Another possible construction would be to examine the tasks associated with the 
activities and conduct that particular mapping. This would provide an opportunity to 
study whether or not the change in mapping would produce any noticeable results in the 
final framework. 
Finally, while this research offers Systems Engineers the ability to efficiently 
prioritize and apply vetted SSE processes and activities in order to maximize return on 
investment and minimize the costs associated with it, the current research lacks a suitable 
metric for measuring the efficiency being claimed by the thesis. Developing or adopting 
an appropriate metric for analysis would provide increased validity to the framework. 
Possible metrics that should be examined include level of security and/or costs as a result 
of implementing the framework.   
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Prologue 
Lastly, some insights and lessons learned throughout the research process to other 
students. Systems Engineering, and to a further extent, Systems Security Engineering, are 
very broad areas of study with no hard guidelines or check lists to ensure that complete 
understanding and applicability is guaranteed. As a student of the Computer Science and 
Computer Engineering Department with a Bachelor’s in Computer Telecommunications 
Engineering, a Master’s in System Engineering, and an AFIT curriculum in Cyber 
Operations, I found myself with a unique opportunity to tackling this research area. With 
a detailed understanding of the technical aspects of IT, and cyber, and security systems, 
coupled alongside a comprehensive familiarity of systems procurement and development, 
identifying a need for and following through with this area of research was still quite 
difficult at times.  
 For those lacking a similar background, however, don’t fret. In fact, your varied 
experiences and points of views could bring novel insight and provide new understanding 
to SSE research that I could never have thought possible. While a good SE understanding 
provides much of the underlying foundation needed to follow-on this work, having a 
good understanding at the way “traditional” engineers think and process information 
(such as in Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, 
Security Engineering) also has its benefits. To this, I recommend at least browsing 
through Ross Anderson’s book, Security Engineering, as it provides not only a high level 
overview of security applications to a variety of important systems, but also an in-depth 
understanding on critical topics such as technical engineering basics, specialized 
protection mechanisms, security psychology, policy, and much more. Additionally, the 
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Defense Acquisition Guidebook, particularly Chapter 13 on Program Protection, provides 
valuable SE and technical insight into how the DoD focuses on systems and systems 
security. 
Secondly, regarding concept of, this research was very conceptual (especially at 
the onset), providing very little confirmation of correctness or success level. It was not 
until the final article that there was an actual new product being developed (the 
framework) that provided any real sense of completion or accomplishment. From this 
experience, I recommend not letting the absence of tangible results in the early- and mid-
research timeframes discourage you, but help set a path for discussion between you and 
your research advisor or committee in determining what success ultimately means to you. 
 Finally, while coursework largely depends on the student’s curriculum and degree 
program and usually encompasses the first half of your time at AFIT, starting work on 
your thesis during this first half, no matter how trivial (such as gathering, reading, and 
documenting background works related to your thesis), allows you to more evenly 
allocate the workload throughout the entire program, rather than forcing you to sharply 
increase the effort in order to meet mandatory deadlines. Building a large buffer towards 
to the end of your time at AFIT by focusing on work earlier rather than later allows you 
to avoid much of the stress and pressure many students end up dealing with by focusing 
only on coursework during the beginning. That isn’t to say, however, that you shouldn’t 
focus on your coursework and grades; it’s just as important as finishing up your thesis! 
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